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Executive Summary 
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) is a relatively new and powerful tool for community development. Congress 
authorized $26 billion worth of credits between 2002 and 2009. There is a strong likelihood that it will authorize 
an additional $5 billion in NMTCs in 2010 and then again in 2011 (U.S. Treasury 2010). This large-scale program 
has attracted considerable industry and academic attention and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
reviewed the program four times. However, the extreme market volatility and pipeline challenges caused by the 
recession provide an opportunity to evaluate the NMTC program from a new perspective.1
A survey by the Center for Community Development Investments of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
in early 2010 yielded valuable insight from 53 NMTC stakeholders about their pipeline and market strategies [see 
Part II]. Respondents’ NMTC pipelines outperformed their non-NMTC investments. Surprisingly, respondents 
increased their concentration in real estate activities during the recession and are assuming more risk now than 
they had before the recession began. These survey findings are consistent with three qualitative case studies that I 
developed as part of my spring 2010 Master’s thesis on NMTC stakeholders’ participation in neighborhood change 
projects (see Appendix C).
These NMTC stakeholders also affirmed their adherence to the original intent of the program: to attract market-
rate investors to qualifying projects in low-income communities that would have locally controlled community 
benefits.2 They use the leverage of NMTCs, local knowledge and social networks, and diverse coalitions of private, 
public, nonprofit, and grassroots organizations to source deals and build their NMTC pipelines. In particular, 
stakeholders use their cost-of-capital advantages derived from using NMTCs to push these community-benefiting 
projects past the funding tipping point. NMTCs have been making it possible for stakeholders to overcome financ-
ing gaps and keep projects in motion, despite severe credit market challenges.
The NMTC program’s success is underscored by respondents’ continued participation over several years and the 
repeat business from their clients that continue to use NMTC to fill capital gaps. At the same time, however, chal-
lenges persist, such as the falling value of the credits (GAO 2010: 23) and the transactional costs of executing–and 
exiting–NMTC investments (GAO 2010: 28). 
Survey responses indicate that among Community Development Entities (CDEs) that have participated in NMTC 
in the past, interest in the 2010 NMTC allocation round has declined. This could result in an oversupply of credits 
and a further decline in their value. Congress and the Treasury Department, which administers the NMTC program, 
have begun a formal evaluation to determine how to boost demand and correct this imbalance. There are plans to 
enact some changes this year (2010), such as expanding the categories of tax offsets from NMTCs to include the Al-
ternative Minimum Tax (AMT), which would bring wealthy individual investors into the NMTC marketplace (U.S. 
Treasury 2010).
In Part III, I offer recommendations for improvements to the NMTC program that draw on the survey responses 
and the NMTC literature. The most important recommendation is that Congress permanently authorize NMTC, as 
the perennial uncertainty surrounding the program’s renewal reduces the supply of potential investors and may be 
a contributing factor in the declining value of the credits. Congress should also consider additional measures that 
would boost the supply of eligible investments and investor demand for NMTCs. These could include a re-evalua-
tion of the definition of poverty, which would make more low-income communities eligible for investment; allow-
ing NMTCs to offset the AMT; and creating an NMTC product with a shorter, more liquid holding period.
1	 	In	authorizing	the	NMTC	Program,	Congress	mandated	that	GAO	review	the	program	four	times.	GAO	has	published	New Markets 
Tax Credit: Status of Implementation and Issues Related to GAO’s Mandated Reports (2002), New Markets Tax Credit Program: Prog-
ress Made in Implementation, but Further Actions Needed to Monitor Compliance (2004),	New Markets Tax Credit: Minority Entities 
Are Less Successful in Obtaining Awards Than Non-Minority Entities (2009), and	New Markets Tax Credit: The Credit Helps Fund a 
Variety of Projects in Low-Income Communities, but Could Be Simplified (2010).GAO	has	also	published	Tax Policy: New Markets Tax 
Credits Appears to Increase Investment by Investors in Low-Income Communities, but Opportunities Exist to Better Monitor Compli-
ance (2007).
2	 	The	NMTC	program’s	intentions	and	outcomes	are	reviewed	in	Part	I:	The	New	Markets	Tax	Credit	Program.	For	additional	informa-
tion,	see	Armistead	(2005),	and	Rubin	and	Stankewiecz	(2005).5
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Part I: The New Markes Tax Credts Program
Background on the New Markets Tax Credit Program 
Scale of the New Markets Tax Credit Program Investment
B
etween 2002 and 2009, the U.S. Congress authorized $26 billion worth of New Markets Tax Credits 
(NMTCs), and the U.S. Treasury Department anticipates congressional authorization of an additional $5 
billion in 2010.1 The volume of NMTCs has escalated rapidly, as can be seen in Figure 1, from a first-year 
allocation of $2.5 billion in 2002 to an annual allocation of nearly $5 billion in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (pro-
jected). There was no allocation in 2004.2
The Treasury Department reports that demand for NMTCs has greatly outstripped supply during each allocation 
round. When supply and demand data is normalized, however, supply has grown at a much faster rate than demand 
since 2005. The result is a widening gap in the marketplace’s interest in NMTC, which hints at the possibility of 
market saturation. The Treasury Department’s proposed program reforms have implicitly acknowledged this gap, as 
have analysis from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and responses to the industry survey conducted 
by the San Francisco Federal Reserve to support this report (Gambrell 2009; GAO 2010; U.S. Treasury 2010).
Figure 1. NMTC Awards and CDE Demand
NMTC Awarded versus NMTC Requested 
(nominal $ in billions)
NMTC Awarded versus NMTC Requested  
(normalized data, 2002=100)
Sources: U.S. Treasury Dept. CDFI Historical Awards Database; NMTCC 2008:4; CDFI Fund June 9, 2010
There is no definitive figure on the amount of private investment that the NMTC has leveraged, but the New 
1	 	Competitive	applications	for	the	2010	Round	were	due	by	June	4th	(CDFI	Fund	June	9,	2010).
2	 	The	chart	on	the	left	depicts	the	volume	of	NMTCs	requested	versus	the	amount	that	were	allocated.	This	healthy	demand	contrasts	with	the	chart	on	the	
right,	where	I	have	normalized	the	demand	versus	supply	of	NMTCs.	For	the	chart	on	the	right,	demand	and	supply	volumes	were	set	equal	to	100	for	
the	year	2002.	While,	in	real	dollar	terms,	demand	far	exceeds	supply	as	shown	on	the	left,	at	the	same	time	the	relative	increase	in	demand	is	not	keep-
ing	up	with	the	increased	volume	of	credits	offered	by	the	Treasury	Department.
$ (billions)
$ (billions)
Supply-Demand
Gap }8
Markets Tax Credit Coalition, the largest industry group, estimates that every $1 of NMTCs has raised an additional 
$1.12 in investment (NMTCC 2010: 17). In practice, NMTCs are nearly always leveraged with sources of public 
money as well as additional tax credits in a practice known as “twinning.” This can result in even more significant 
public financing at the project level. 
NMTCs have been awarded in every state, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. dependencies. Through 2008, California re-
ceived $1.2 billion in NMTC investment, representing nearly 10 percent of total dollars and 12 percent of projects. 
New York, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Ohio round out the top five recipients, whereas the District of Columbia, 
Rhode Island, Louisiana, Maine, and Massachusetts have the highest per capita totals.3  Metropolitan areas have 
received more than 90 percent of NMTC awards, but the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) 
Fund is now attempting to channel 20 percent toward rural areas (GAO 2010: 10). 
Community Development Context
The United States has a history of financial disinvestment in poor communities, many of them communities of 
color. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke recently described this history and its consequences in a 2007 
speech commemorating the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977. Fueled by racial tension 
and the rapid expansion of the suburbs, he said, many poor communities became isolated from mainstream so-
cial networks and labor markets, contributing to chronic multigenerational poverty. “Redlining,” or explicit lender 
discrimination against certain communities, exacerbated the isolation. Redlining limited residents’ opportunities to 
obtain mortgages, access credit for personal or business use, or accumulate wealth through savings and investments 
(Bernanke 2007). Many academic researchers and economists have interpreted long-term institutional disinvestment 
in poor communities as a market failure, most likely due to an asymmetry of information between the capital mar-
kets and investment targets about potential returns on investments in the communities that were being neglected 
(Caskey and Hollister 2001).
Many lenders claimed that the practice of avoiding certain communities was due to the risk of investing, and that 
their portfolios would be less competitive (and their losses greater) than those of other banks if they lent in these 
communities. Congress passed CRA to compel banks to reinvest in poor communities where banks accepted depos-
its, partly in exchange for the guarantee of government insurance on those deposits (Bernanke 2007). 
To address this lack of access to essential financial services and credit, the federal government has experimented with 
a number of interventions during the past several decades. Many of these attempts have been met with criticism, 
however, such as a lack of community involvement and influence in projects, the types of companies that were at-
tracted and the nature of the jobs that were created (Johnson 1995).
Against prevailing capital market and corporate sentiment, Michael Porter in 1994 argued that many disinvested 
communities represented lost opportunities for private profit. In particular, Porter honed in on the advantageous 
locations near central business districts and freeways of many of these poor communities, the availability of in-
expensive labor, and the high population densities that represented enough aggregate purchasing power to rival 
less-densely populated but more affluent communities. Essentially, Porter proposed a variant of the market failure 
theory for these communities but advocated that outside capital forces intervene in them (Porter 1994). 
Several urban planning theorists and practitioners directly rebutted Porter’s strategy of attracting externally-directed 
investment to low-income communities. In particular, James Johnson (1995) claimed that Porter overlooked the 
value of social networks and social capital for allocating resources in poor communities. Johnson was joined by 
Susan Fainstein (1995), who also argued that the people who live and work in these communities are in the best 
position to know how capital should be invested, both for profit and social impact. Porter’s hypothesis led to a 
vigorous debate over alternative causes and solutions for resolving a chronic lack of resources and opportunities for 
poor communities with renewed attention on the need for government intervention, and the importance of social 
networks, grassroots-based organizations, and local development corporations (Fainstein 1995; Johnson 1995).
In fact, many organizations aimed at local capacity development had arisen to address the investment void, capital-
izing on their local knowledge, community networks, and social capital. In particular, Community Development 
3	 	Congress	authorized	supplemental	NMTC	awards	for	Louisiana	and	adjacent	areas	as	part	of	the	federal	relief	effort	following	Hurricane	Katrina.9
Corporations (CDCs) were emerging as housing developers, owners and operators of community facilities, and 
social service providers (Gittell 1990; NCCED 1999). The rise of local CDCs was also part of a larger movement to-
ward public-private partnerships to support neighborhood revitalization, economic development, and social service 
delivery. In the 1970s, local public-private partnership revitalization projects began to take the place of top-down, 
government investment in at-risk communities (Schultze 1977). 
The public-private strategy expanded the resources available to governments by leveraging the expertise and capital 
of the private sector to achieve public policy and planning intentions. In addition, this involvement made the private 
sector a stakeholder, often with an equity incentive, in the success of revitalization efforts. Research on public-private 
partnerships operating in low-income communities has documented significantly more negotiation among roles, 
financial returns, and community benefits than would be anticipated by involving for-profit interests (Sagalyn 2007). 
A new wave of financial institutions with social impact missions also began to invest profitably in poorer communi-
ties. These institutions began with pioneers such as ShoreBank in Chicago. In 1994, Congress passed the Commu-
nity Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Act to support these new institutions. They were locally controlled 
organizations that pooled public, nonprofit, and financial institution funding sources. The CRA, revised in 1995, 
created incentives for for-profit financial institutions to invest in these CDFIs. By definition, CDFIs focused on 
community development goals and, as a result, would accept lower financial returns and a higher level of risk (Cas-
key and Hollister 2001). 
Legislative Intent of New Markets Tax Credits
As dissatisfaction with purely public solutions and redistributive policies grew throughout the late 1990s and third-
way models (neither purely public nor purely private) began to gain traction, President Clinton and his economic 
policy team sought a novel solution in New Markets Tax Credits (NMTC) that would engage capital investors and 
empower the residents of poor communities with some local control over how capital would be invested (Phil-
lips 2000; Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). The Clinton team coined the phrase “new markets” to describe the poor 
urban, suburban, and rural communities that are the targets of the program, with investment channeled to projects 
that would have desirable community impacts, such as workforce development, job creation, business incubation, 
entrepreneurial growth, nonprofit expansion, blight removal, and the provision of needed services such as medical 
care (Armistead 2005).
The Clinton administration and Congress intended that the NMTC program would wed the capital markets with 
local community-based organizations, now referred to as Community Development Entities (CDEs) (Clinton 
2000). These local organizations would deploy this capital to achieve fair investor returns and the maximum social 
benefit in underinvested communities, with full resident participation in determining how this would be achieved 
(Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). These organizations, many of which are CDCs and CDFIs, invest in eligible projects 
in qualifying communities as determined by poverty and economic development measures at the census tract level. 
Currently, 39 percent of U.S. census tracts, home to 36 percent of the population, qualify for NMTCs (GAO 2010: 
8). This strategy provides the CDE with leverage over the selection and development of qualifying projects.
In 2000, Congress passed the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act. The act stipulated $15 billion in allocation 
authority and authorized the NMTC program through 2007. Congress has reauthorized the program four times. It 
added a supplemental $1 billion of NMTCs as one of many investment tools in response to the devastation caused 
by Hurricane Katrina. As part of the federal response to the “Great Recession,” Congress added another $3 billion 
in NMTCs to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), with half awarded retroactively to 2008 ap-
plicants that had not received an allocation during the first round (GAO 2010: 3). At this time, the CDFI Fund and 
the Obama administration anticipate that Congress will authorize $5 billion in NMTCs for 2010 and another $5 
billion for 2011 (Gambrell 2009; U.S. Treasury 2010). 
To attract private capital, investors receive federal corporate tax breaks that provide a low-risk minimum return and 
augment the returns that community-benefiting projects might return to equity investors. As described in a 2002 
speech by former CDFI Fund director Tony Brown, NMTCs were expected to harness “patient capital” (Brown 
2002). Because many investors are financial institutions, the purchase of NMTCs also helps them to fulfill their 
CRA obligations. The low-risk return by way of NMTC federal tax offsets—equal to 39 percent of the total equity 10
investment in a community-based organization, but which can be significantly higher owing to leverage—can be 
modeled as a fixed-income return to the investor.4 
Depending on the structure of the deal, investors can also realize capital gains on the difference between the pur-
chase price and redemption value of the credits, fees, interest, principal recapture if the project investment is a loan, 
or equity upside if the project investment is an equity stake. In the event that the financial institution records an 
annual loss, the tax offset can be carried back retroactively for one year or forward for up to 20 years (GAO 2010: 
6). To further enhance investor returns and raise necessary capital, many NMTC-backed projects also incorporate 
other sources of subsidized public and nonprofit capital, which brings these additional funders into the coalitions as 
stakeholders (MHIC 2006:2,18,22,27; Travois New Markets LLC 2006:5,19).
The uncertainty surrounding the perennial renewal of the NMTC creates pipeline and investor risks. There is also 
investor risk associated with CDE default on the investment, CDE bankruptcy, or an IRS finding of NMTC ineli-
gibility for the CDE’s project investments. This risk is somewhat mitigated, however, by investment loss provisions 
in the tax code, IRS allowance for the redeployment of the NMTC, and IRS cure provisions for projects that fail 
NMTC eligibility tests (Novogradac 2010:3-5). The IRS ensures compliance with investment requirements.
Not only do NMTCs require the participation of multiple parties—investors and community-based organizations—
but the spirit of the program has led to the development of large public-private coalitions. This is consistent with 
third-way options that gained in popularity during the Clinton administration (Erickson 2009). In particular, large 
redevelopment initiatives that are supported by NMTCs have united capital investors, community-based organi-
zations, foundations, service delivery providers, grassroots and neighborhood organizations, public agencies, and 
elected officials (Armistead 2005).
Many types of projects are eligible for NMTCs. For-rent housing is the single greatest exception, as this can account 
for no more than 80 percent of any qualifying project. As a result, projects that do have large rental residential 
components devote at least 20 percent of their total value or square footage to community centers, charter schools, 
ground-floor retail, or mixed-use development (CDFI Fund website 2010). The framers of the NMTC had intended 
that investments would be channeled into business development, health and social services, community facilities, 
and real estate activities. A strong bias or “real estate tilt” has developed, however, with estimates that at least 65 
percent of program dollars have financed real estate activities (Armistead 2005; Lambie-Hanson 2008: 21). 
The NMTC program provides a great deal of flexibility in defining community benefits. Even from the beginning, 
the open-ended legislative intent led the CDFI Fund to solicit ideas from measuring impact from potential investors 
and prospective NMTC participants. In a 2002 address to the Community Development Venture Capital Alliance, 
former CDFI Fund Director Tony Brown stated: “we will need your assistance and cooperation in helping us design 
a process that will measure impact and sustainable economic growth from the funds you raise using NMTCs” 
(Brown 2002).
New Markets Tax Credit Program Implementation
Although Congress authorizes NMTC, the U.S. Treasury Department allocates the credits to community-based 
organizations. The CDFI Fund within the Treasury Department awards NMTCs through a competitive allocation 
process. According to Brown, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill “made creating jobs and improving living standards of 
people everywhere the standard by which to measure the impact Community Development Entities and Commu-
nity Development Financial Institution have in the marketplace” (Brown 2004).
The CDFI Fund will only award NMTCs to a prequalified CDE. All CDFIs are automatically prequalified. Other 
organizations, including many Community Development Corporations, apply to be certified as CDEs. The CDFI 
Fund considers a number of factors during the certification process, including mission, financial capacity, resources, 
development track record, and social impacts in poor communities. Both for-profit and nonprofit CDEs can com-
pete for NMTCs, but only for-profit CDEs can make equity investments in projects. As a result, many nonprofit 
CDEs spin off a wholly-owned, special-purpose CDE for NMTC (CDFI 2010a; GAO 2010: 5).
4	 	The	tax	credit	offsets	are	5	percent	of	the	total	equity	investment	in	years	1	through	3,	and	6	percent	in	years	4	through	7.	11
Although there are more than 3,204 CDEs, the majority of the 396 NMTC awards have been concentrated among 
just a few incumbents (CDFI Fund 2010d). Many CDEs are wholly controlled by NMTC investors, such as banks or 
quasi-public development entities. A  nonprofit CDE can also form a for-profit, special-purpose CDE in the event 
of a CDFI Fund award (GAO 2010: 5). Community Development Entities have specialized according to economic 
development, community benefit, investment criteria, and geographic scope. One of the consequences of this spe-
cialization is that a more limited CDE has less portfolio diversity and is more exposed to concentrated market risks. 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s process for distributing NMTC awards is complex. The NMTC applications 
require both quantitative and qualitative responses from CDEs regarding overall business strategy; portfolio per-
formance; governance, community relationships; the use and rate of return of past NMTC allocations, including 
additional investment leveraged with NMTC awards; temporary and permanent jobs created; types of businesses 
attracted or created; community benefits attributed to past projects; projects that are in the investment pipeline; and 
the anticipated use of any new NMTC awards (CDFI Fund 2010a). In 2009, the CDFI Fund added a question to 
promote efforts to limit gentrification (CDFI Fund 2009).
Panels of evaluators with experience in business, real estate, or community development finance evaluate and rank 
the applications. Following this qualifying round, CDFI Fund staff determine the size of the NMTC allocation, 
if any, that it will award to each CDE. The allocation is based on the staff’s estimation of the CDE’s capacity to 
sell the credits to investors, the strength of the CDE’s project pipeline, and the likelihood for rapid and successful 
deployment of the credits (GAO 2010: 6-8). After the CDFI Fund makes its awards, it provides to CDEs the written 
feedback and application score with the intention that this will assist CDEs in preparing stronger future applications 
(CDFI Fund 2010a).
Many industry representatives, the GAO, and critics have charged that the application and award process is lengthy, 
complex, and opaque. The awards process is based on subjective evaluations by community development and finan-
cial experts recruited by CDFI. Their evaluations are based on CDE’s self-reported data and analysis for financial re-
turns and community benefits, which are not standardized or synthesized in a prescribed manner.5 The evaluations 
are not made available to the general public nor are they independently audited. Furthermore, the CDFI Fund does 
not keep follow-up data on failed or incomplete projects, which means that data cannot be used to shape future al-
location decision making (GAO 2004, 2010). 
Researchers have argued that the evaluation process favors NMTC applications that project higher returns on 
investment; present larger and less complex, “one-shot” projects; result in rapid and less thoughtful deployment of 
NMTC; and include backing from proven, well-funded banks. This may unintentionally penalize NMTC applica-
tions for projects with greater community benefits or those that are sponsored by smaller community-based finan-
cial institutions (Armistead 2005). Furthermore, the process contains opportunities to inconsistently apply standards 
that may result in a process bias favoring financial returns over community benefits (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). 
Tax Credits and Community Investment
Federal, state, and local governments use tax credits extensively to support investments that are intended to promote 
the common good. Examples of successful programs include the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, Historic Tax 
Credit, Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit, and Renewable Energy Tax Credits, to name a few. Several state govern-
ments have set up their own version of the NMTC program, so that it is possible for a project to qualify for both 
federal and state credits. Tax credits represent a loss of tax revenue to the government. As a result, the public value 
of these lost revenues must be carefully addressed (Howard 1997), albeit for the purpose of addressing a social need 
that is neglected by the market.
The social value of the credits derives from the authorizing legislation’s requirement to invest “substantially all” 
of the proceeds from the sale of NMTCs into qualifying investments in low-income communities.6 The net dollar 
value of NMTCs to communities is difficult to quantify, however. The CDFI Fund does not collect data on the 
amount that investors pay for the credits, which can be substantially less than face value. Investors do pay taxes on 
5	 	The	CDFI	Fund	requires	CDEs	to	report	the	impact	of	their	investment	targets	through	the	Community	Investment	Impact	System	(CIIS).	
6	 	According	to	the	“substantially	all”	test,	the	CDE	must	invest	85	percent	in	years	1	through	6	and	75	percent	in	year	7,	by	individual	project	or	aggre-
gate	gross	assets	of	the	CDE.12
the capital gains on earnings during the seven-year holding period and on the return on equity. The GAO (2010: 
21) estimates that 50 to 65 percent of the tax offsets claimed by the investors remain as equity in businesses in low-
income communities at the end of the holding period. 
The investor’s return depends largely on whether the investment is debt or equity, the amount of public subsidy 
that is part of the total qualified investment, and whether additional leverage is employed (see appendix B).7 An 
NMTC return on debt can be as low as a net present value of 6 percent annually, and a return on equity can be 
as high as a net present value of 39 percent annually. By definition, for-profit and nonprofit CDFIs accept below-
market returns as a tradeoff for furthering community development goals (Caskey and Hollister 2001). The levered 
or unlevered structure of the investment and the hurdle rate for investor returns (the investor’s minimum required 
return) profoundly affects the social impact of the investment. The structure of the investment also plays a large 
role in the amount of subsidy available to further social impact and community benefits. For example, if part of the 
investment is forgivable debt, the investor passes through NMTC cost-of-capital benefits to subsidize the project 
or the end-users (such as a nonprofit tenant) (see the case studies in appendix C for more examples of investment 
scenarios).
There is inherent investor risk in NMTCs as a result of compliance and holding periods, transaction costs, and dura-
tion uncertainty in timing the redemption of credits according to corporate profits. NMTCs have been criticized 
for their complexity, which has fueled high legal, closing, and exit costs. For example, the related-party test prevents 
a CDE from controlling more than 50 percent of a business in which it makes a qualifying investment.8 At closing, 
CDEs must also obtain a legal opinion that loans to qualifying businesses in low-income communities represent 
“true debt” that is not yielding an equity return. The cost of this legal opinion adds another layer of complexity to 
the investor’s exit (GAO 2010: 19, 31). With the volatility of the market, and particularly the recent severe recession, 
many financial institutions had losses. As a result, they had to bank the credits for the future, reducing the credits’ 
net present value. 
While the real risk level has remained steady, the average expected rate of return for investors has declined, accord-
ing to a 2007 GAO evaluation. In 2003, investors expected a rate of return of 8.2 percent, but by 2007, the expected 
rate of return had dropped to 6.8 percent. GAO hypothesized that this decline could stem from greater comfort 
and familiarity with the program, resulting in lower perceived risk that led investors to reduce their risk premium on 
these investments. Furthermore, more investors entered the NMTC marketplace, fueling more competitive pric-
ing and reducing the spread. This greater comfort with the program came about even as the legal and transactional 
structures of NMTC investments grew more complicated. Another important contributing factor to the declining 
rate of return was investors’ growing certainty that Congress would renew the program. At the outset of the pro-
gram, potential investors reacted negatively to the uncertainty surrounding the program’s reauthorization, demand-
ing a higher risk premium that corresponded to a higher rate of return (GAO 2007: 27). 
Because, as noted, demand for NMTCs consistently outstrips supply, credit prices should stabilize at a consistently 
high value. According to the GAO, however, investors appear to be paying less for tax credits than in previous years 
and they made fewer investments in NMTCs in 2009 than in previous years. In addition, investment by CDEs 
dropped from approximately $3.25 billion in 2008 to approximately $2.5 billion in 2009 (GAO 2010: i). This could 
result in a higher implied rate of return for investors if the spread increases between the net present value of the tax 
credit offset and the purchase price of the credits.
Given that investors have historically purchased the tax credits at 75 to 80 cents on the dollar, the value of the sub-
sidy for achieving projects in the public good is immediately reduced by 20 to 25 percent. It appears that they may 
sell for as little as 50 cents on the dollar in 2010, if the trend of declining values continues (GAO 2010: 23). If a full 
$5 billion of credits are allocated, the potential immediate loss in the subsidy value would be at least $2.5 billion for 
low-income communities. The government’s loss of revenue could be fairly long-term as investors in the credits can 
carry back the offset one year or forward for up to 20 years. A mitigating factor, however, is that corporate profits 
are generally correlated to government tax receipts, concentrating any tax revenue losses due to NMTCs in years 
when tax revenues are strong. 
7	 	Invested	funds	in	a	special-purpose	entity	can	be	combined	with	funds	from	a	leveraged	lender,	and	this	larger	total	comprises	the	qualifying	invest-
ment	in	the	CDE.	As	a	result,	the	investor	can	claim	the	larger	qualified	equity	investment	as	an	offset	against	corporate	taxes,	effectively	multiplying	the	
investment	yield	(Travois	New	Markets	2006;	GAO	2010).	
8	 	The	New	Markets	Tax	Credit	Coalition	has	targeted	the	related-party	test	for	repeal	owing	to	the	complexity	and	transaction	costs	it	adds	to	NMTC	
deals	(NMTCC	2008).	13
Assessing the Impact of New Markets Tax Credits
NMTCs are critical to pushing many projects over the funding tipping point. According to GAO, NMTCs are often 
used for “gap financing,” at an average 36 percent of total project costs. (The CDFI Fund and the NMTC industry 
estimate the gap to be more akin to between 20 and 30 percent.) Approximately 85 percent of NMTCs are deployed 
as term loans (GAO 2010: 14). Community Development Entities have invested 65 percent of NMTCs in real estate 
projects, nearly all of which are commercial and mixed-use real estate development and rehabilitation. Community 
Development Entities have invested another 22 percent in businesses development in low-income communities 
(Lambie-Hanson 2008: 22). Partnership projects and projects sponsored by for-profit CDEs have a much greater “real 
estate tilt,” while nonprofit CDEs are more likely to sponsor non-real-estate projects (57.5 percent) (GAO 2010: 13).
Stakeholders, oversight agencies, and academics have identified potential weaknesses in the NMTC program. One 
weakness is a possible excessive return for a private investor at the expense of meaningful community benefits. 
In addition, the awards allocation process may be biased toward more profit-driven organizations and deals that 
project (but do not necessarily deliver) the highest financial returns (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005). Awards may also 
be unintentionally racially biased. According to the GAO, minority applicants are often less likely to win an NMTC 
allocation because minority control is often associated with smaller financial institutions or institutions with higher 
operating costs (GAO 2009: 7-8). Past awards have shown a bias toward commercial real estate development, which 
often results in fewer jobs, and those jobs have tended to pay less than other NMTC-backed projects. Also, NMTC 
projects may be applied to deals that would have occurred regardless of the subsidy. Another potential weakness is 
that the self-reported economic impact analysis of NMTC-backed projects may be methodologically flawed, so that 
a fair ranking among NMTC applicants may not be possible, potentially resulting in an award to a less-competitive 
project. Finally, the complexity of the program may be limiting its overall impact, and the application process may 
inherently favor for-profits over nonprofits and public entities (Armistead 2005; GAO 2010).
That NMTC-backed investments may have happened regardless of the NMTC represents one of the program’s 
greatest challenges. The GAO has referred to this as a “but for” test in its evaluations. However, as their report notes: 
“limitations with available data make it difficult to isolate project impacts and GAO’s analysis does not allow it to 
determine whether the projects supported by NMTC would have taken place absent the credit” (GAO 2010: i). 
Isolating the impact of NMTCs from other factors influencing business growth, job creation, or asset appreciation 
is extremely difficult. This difficulty is also an issue with development-focused financial institutions in general, as 
there is no standardized methodology for doing so (Lawlor and Nicholls 2008; Caskey and Hollister 2001).
Despite the complexity of the process and the issues surrounding the awards process and their allocation, many 
have heralded the NMTC as a success. In 2008, the Harvard Kennedy School of Government named the NMTC 
to a list of the 50 most important innovations in American government (Harvard Kennedy School 2009). In addi-
tion, the popular and industry press, academic researchers, and organizations representing the CDFI industry, such 
as the New Markets Tax Credit Coalition (NMTCC), have compiled numerous success stories that they attribute 
to NMTC. In fact, the NMTCC has compiled binders of press clippings that number in the hundreds of pages 
(NMTCC website 2009).
The use of the NMTC provides a lower cost-of-capital for projects, which can nudge them over the tipping point 
toward feasibility. The NMTC has successfully attracted the interest of the private capital markets (Chamberlain 
2006). The GAO finds that individual and corporate NMTC investors shifted some of their investments from 
higher-income to lower-income communities as a result of the NMTC (GAO 2007: 34-37).  Many NMTC deal 
structures allow advantageous financing and, as such, support higher community impacts. Although 85 percent of 
NMTCs are used for term loans, the credits are also used as debt with equity features or revolving lines of credit. 
Transactions can be structured with forgivable debt or paid-in equity, grants or subsidies, waived fees, capitalized 
interest, and other favorable terms that support the CDE’s target investments. It is also possible to refinance NMTC 
loans with new NMTC loans if there are material changes in the original investment (GAO 2010: 14-16). 14
Proposed Reforms Under Consideration
The CDFI Fund is currently evaluating potential changes to the application and award process. It recently com-
pleted a public scoping process and will soon oversee an independent survey to CDEs. The Urban Institute will 
conduct the survey and develop the case studies, with a report due in 2011 (GAO 2010: 32). Secretary of the Trea-
sury Timothy Geithner and CDFI Fund Director Donna Gambrell have also mentioned several possible changes in 
recent speeches (Geithner 2010; Gambrell 2009).
NMTCs are never purchased at face value, which further enhances the NMTC investor’s return. The recent decline 
to 50 cents on the dollar in the NMTCs value, as noted above, could be a cyclical response to the recession or 
a structural problem owing to the enormous increase in the supply of NMTCs. In response to falling prices, the 
Obama administration is seeking ways to expand the pool of potential investors through additional incentives or an 
expansion of potential qualified investments (Gambrell 2009). 
The Treasury Department is also advocating using the NMTC to offset the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), po-
tentially attracting high net worth private investors to the marketplace. This AMT offset is already used to encour-
age investment in Low Income Housing Tax Credits and Historic Rehabilitation Credits. Although such an offset 
would lower federal tax revenues, any increase in the purchase price of the NMTC would result in a higher portion 
of invested dollars and more assets retained in low-income communities (GAO 2010: 24). 
One major change that the CDFI Fund anticipates in 2010 would allow CDEs to apply the “related-party” rule be-
fore, rather than after, making an investment. The related-party rule is intended to prevent a CDE from investing in a 
captive low-income community business in which it has a 50 percent or greater ownership stake. By applying the rule 
before the investment, a CDE could make a much larger investment without violating the rule (Gambrell 2009).15
Part II: Survey Insights into the NMTC Pipeline 
and Volatile Market Conditions
Introduction
W
ith the goal of better understanding the current strategies of NMTCs in a time of market uncertainty, 
the San Francisco Federal Reserve’s Center for Community Development Investments administered 
the NMTC survey at the beginning of 2010. Of the 53 NMTC stakeholders who responded, all were 
CDEs. The survey sought to answer the research question, “What project pipeline development 
strategies have NMTC participants used to maintain a continuous deal flow, in spite of funding gaps and market 
volatility?” 
For the respondents, the NMTC pipeline has outperformed alternative investments during the recession and ac-
counts for a growing share of assets, revenue, and human resources.  Community Development Entities’ invest-
ments continue to favor real estate, and this reliance is growing. Community Development Entities also devise 
their own methods of measuring community benefits, which influences their award allocations and the likelihood 
of receiving future allocations. Their success in meeting political and community interests appears to be correlated 
with their ability to source deals and additional public funds to keep their pipelines full. 
NMTC investments are supporting a pipeline that can better withstand funding challenges and tremendous market 
volatility than alternative investments. The majority of the pipeline is sourced internally and from community-
based relationships as well as larger revitalization and planning initiatives. Furthermore, this increasing commitment 
to NMTC demonstrates that the respondents have faith in future financial and community-building returns from 
continued participation in the program. 
One of the most notable survey findings was that the CDEs that responded are nevertheless anticipating a pull-
back in NMTC participation in the 2010 round, just as Congress is intending to pump another $5 billion worth of 
NMTCs into the community development and tax credit marketplace. With such a decline in interest in the face of 
growing supply, there is a possibility that the value of the credits will decline, possibly to as low as 50 cents on the 
dollar (GAO 2010: 28-29). To ensure that the full $5 billion is deployed, the CDFI Fund may be forced to make 
NMTC awards to projects that have lower underwriting quality or social impact. 
When the price of NMTCs dips, CDEs must aggressively seek out supplemental capital to shore up project financ-
ing, or begin cutting the community benefits portion of projects that would have been subsidized if NMTCs were 
commanding a higher value. Most CDEs use the NMTC-subsidized capital to reduce financing costs in projects 
they believe will have a high social impact in impoverished communities. The reality is that although NMTCs con-
stitute an important part of the capital stack for projects, CDEs are relying heavily on additional sources of public 
and nonprofit subsidies to fill the rest of their projects’ financing gaps and leverage greater debt borrowing. (See 
appendix C for examples of project capital stacks that combine multiple funding sources.)
On June 9, the CDFI Fund reported strong demand in response to the call for 2010 applications, which would seem 
to contradict the survey’s findings. It remains to be seen if this reflects many new entrants to the field, as opposed 
to the incumbents that participated in the survey. Furthermore, the awards are based on CDE interest and do not 
necessarily reflect investor interest in purchasing NMTC.  
Research Design 
Given the real estate tilt of the NMTC program and the impact of the recession on the national real estate market, 
learning more about how NMTC participants are managing in this crisis is of great importance. The current project 
therefore explores the strategies that NMTC participants are using to maintain a continuous flow of deals through 
their pipeline, despite funding gaps and market volatility. 16
Data Sources
Working in cooperation and close coordination with the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank’s Center for Commu-
nity Development Investments (CCDI), we determined there was no existing data source that would yield insights 
as valuable and timely as those we could gain from launching our own survey. Researchers and the GAO have also 
raised concerns about the CDFI Fund’s award and analysis methods, data collection standards, and lack of au-
dits and follow-up evaluations (GAO 2007, 2010). Industry groups such as the New Markets Tax Credit Coalition 
(NMTCC) and Opportunity Finance Network (OFN) survey their members and produce public reports, but, again, 
we were seeking more detailed information about pipeline performance and the strategies that CDEs employ to 
overcome project financing challenges and market volatility. 
On the basis of a review of previous research and secondary documents, as well as my own experience at a commu-
nity bank assembling NMTC application and project data, I drafted the original survey instrument in late Novem-
ber 2009. David Erickson and Ian Galloway of CCDI reviewed the draft and made suggestions to improve clarity 
and response rates. We also reached out to Linda Davenport of the NMTCC and Donna Fabiani of the OFN to 
provide additional review. In addition to their current professional roles, both Davenport and Fabiani have exten-
sive experience working with the CDFI Fund and the Department of the Treasury on NMTC and other community 
development tools. They provided additional suggestions to strengthen the survey. The final survey instrument is 
found in appendix E.
Wherever possible, the survey intent and results have been cross-referenced with secondary documents and research. 
Secondary documents include academic papers investigating NMTC, the extensive community development and 
public-private partnership urban planning and policy literature, and coverage in the industry and popular press. Ad-
ditional research sources include the four congressionally mandated GAO investigations over the past six years, as 
well as findings that have been published by the CDFI Fund and academic researchers. 
Implementation
We launched the survey in mid-January 2010. I administered the survey electronically using off-the-shelf, third-party 
software. We developed the mailing list using the email addresses listed in the CDFI Fund’s historical awards data-
base, as well as CCDI’s proprietary community investment mailing list. 
We had intended to initially keep the survey open for only two weeks, but extended the deadline twice owing to 
back-to-back severe winter storms in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast that kept many potential respondents out of 
the office for a few weeks. CCDI sent email reminders to the mailing list every two weeks and, ultimately, we kept 
the survey open for five weeks. 
Survey Findings 
Response Rate
Fifty-three NMTC participants responded to the online survey. The classification of the respondents is shown in 
Table 1. Nearly all (98.1 percent) self-identified as CDEs, and one self-identified as a CDFI, which is categorically 
prequalified as a CDE. This is to be expected as the core of the mailing list was made up of CDEs. Respondents 
also chose secondary self-identifying labels. Nonprofit CDEs, CDFIs, banks, for-profit mission-based organizations, 
Qualified Low-Income Community Businesses (QALICBs), consultants, and leveraged lenders were well represented. 17
Table 1. NMTC Participant Survey Respondents Secondary Self-Identifying Labels (N = 53)
Role Percent Count
Nonprofit 21.2% 11
CDFI 15.4 8
Bank 9.6 5
For-Profit Mission-Based Organization 7.7 4
QALICB* 5.8 3
Consultant 5.7 3
Leverage Lender** 5.7 3
CDFI Intermediary 1.9 1
Venture Fund 1.9 1
Mission-Based Depository Bank 1.9 1
Industry Group** 1.9 1
Real Estate Service Provider* 1.9 1
*Qualified	Active	Low-Income	Community	Business,	as	defined	by	the	CDFI	Fund	
**Write-in	self-identification	choices	provided	by	the	survey	respondents
Participation in the NMTC Program
Survey respondents demonstrated a long-term involvement in the NMTC program, with at least 50 percent partici-
pating each year beginning in 2004, but a lower predicted participation rate for 2010 (see Figure 2). Participation ac-
celerated between the inception of the program and 2006. This reflects several factors, including a learning curve for 
the NMTC program, the strong performance by incumbents who gained early experience in the program, the grow-
ing availability of NMTCs, and the cultivation of a deal pipeline that made it easier to qualify for follow-on awards. 
Community Development Entities and investors also became more comfortable with the NMTC as it became more 
established and seemed less likely to expire. The following survey question about sourcing deals highlights the im-
portance of repeat clients and referrals, which is a likely factor in the growth in participation rates over time.  
Figure 2. Participation Rates in NMTC versus Total Awards
Source: Survey Respondents Source: CDFI Historical Awards Database18
If the survey responses can be taken as a proxy for the NMTC industry as a whole, the decline in incumbent inter-
est hints at a worrisome trend. Supply may be outpacing demand for NMTC. When the survey responses and the 
NMTC awards are normalized using 2009 figures, there is a disparity between the relative expected participation 
rates and availability, as shown in Figure 3. Community Development Entities that have received past awards may 
also foresee pipeline issues and, as a result, may choose not to participate in the 2010 round.
With this disparity between supply and demand, the value of the credits may continue to decline, a trend confirmed 
by a number of responses to a later survey question. Reforms are under consideration that could increase demand 
for the tax credits, however. In addition, investor demand may rebound as banks and financial institutions return to 
profitability and once again seek offsets to federal taxes on corporate profits.
There are also other possible responses to the supply-demand imbalance. There may be new entrants attracted to 
the increased capital gains made possible by cheap credits, or the CDFI Fund may lower the quality threshold for 
awards to CDEs. Community Development Entities, in turn, may lower their quality threshold for projects. Any of 
these responses could expose NMTC portfolios to greater underwriting risks, if cheaper capital chases more deals or 
underwriting standards become less stringent.
Figure 3. Relative Participation Rates versus Total Awards by Year (Normalized Data, 2009=100)
Sources:	CDFI	Historical	Awards	Database	and	Survey	Respondents
	
Deal Sourcing
NMTC participants have developed a diverse set of pipeline sources for deals, but the majority source projects inter-
nally from board members, executives, or internal cultivation strategies (73.5 percent) or from the loan or underwrit-
ing department (38.8 percent), as shown in Table 2. Of respondents, 8.2 percent indicated that their deal sourcing 
has become more internally driven over time.
Additional important sources include repeat clients (53.1 percent), participation in larger revitalization or redevel-
opment efforts (46.9 percent), and relationships with public agencies (38.8 percent), grassroots organizations (34.7 
percent), and membership organizations (30.6 percent from community development organizations and 20.4 per-
cent from industry coalitions). CDFI intermediaries, executives who serve on other boards, and elected officials also 
contributed strongly to the pipeline. 
Supply-Demand
Gap }19
Participation in public-private development coalitions has a strong positive impact on deal-sourcing. These include 
larger revitalization efforts (46.9 percent), public agencies (38.8 percent), grassroots organizations (34.7 percent), 
community development organizations such as Business Improvement Districts (30.6 percent), elected officials (12.2 
percent), and religious institutions (8.2 percent). 
These deal-sourcing responses highlight the importance of relationships, social networks, and community capital in 
building and maintaining the NMTC pipeline. Nearly one in five respondents (18.4 percent) stated that their deal-
sourcing has become more externally driven over time. This is consistent with urban planning research that reinforc-
es the importance of social networks in poorer urban neighborhoods (Johnson 1995). These findings also highlight 
the interconnectedness of the NMTC and community development industries, which is consistent with the network 
theory of gaining information and learning (Erickson 2009).
Table 2. Sourcing NMTC Deals (N = 49)
Source Percent Count
Internally: deals are sourced based on board members, executives, or internal 
cultivation strategies
73.5% 36
Repeat clients 53.1 26
Larger revitalization or redevelopment efforts 46.9 23
Internally: loan or underwriting department passes deals to us that do not qualify 
for traditional financing
38.8 19
Public agencies 38.8 19
Grassroots organizations 34.7 17
Community development membership organizations such as Business 
Improvement Districts
30.6 15
CDFI intermediaries 24.5 12
Industry coalitions 20.4 10
Executives who serve on other boards 14.3 7
Elected officials 12.2 6
Churches or other religious institutions 8.2 4
Consultants* 4.1 2
Direct community outreach* 4.1 2
Strategic partners* 4.1 2
Attorneys* 2.0 1
Developers bring deals directly* 2.0 1
*Write-in	deal	sourcing	choices	provided	by	the	survey	respondents20
Funding Gaps and Fee-Driven Issues
Funding gaps and fee-driven issues affecting NMTC-backed projects have been widely noted and contribute to un-
derwriting and execution risks that can compromise pipeline projects. Respondents were asked to rate the prevalence 
of these obstacles on a five-point scale. As shown in Table 3, funding gaps were more prevalent, with an average 
rating of 3.33, or between “generally” and “most of the time.” Fee-driven issues were less prevalent, with an average 
rating of 2.14, or between “sometimes” and “generally.” 
Table 3. Prevalence of Funding Gaps and Fee-Driven Issues (N = 46)
Very 
Rarely (1)
Sometimes 
(2)
Generally 
(3) 
Most of the 
Time (4)
Every Proj-
ect (5)
Rating 
Average
Response 
Count
Funding 
Gaps
2 10 14 11 9 3.33 46
Fee-Driven 
Issues
16 13 7 3 3 2.14 42
Twenty-three respondents also provided additional comments; the most common was the difficulty of accessing 
debt and leveraged lenders (nine responses). Transaction costs associated with the NMTC and the structure of 
CDEs received mention (three responses), as did insufficient equity, including owner equity contributions (two 
responses). 
NMTC participants have developed strategic responses to funding gaps and fee-driven issues, as shown in Table 4. 
By far the most common response is to seek out additional sources of public subsidy (67.4 percent), followed by 
additional sources of private or foundation grant-based funding (41.9 percent). In a leveraged deal, this will increase 
the return on equity (ROE) to the investor and subsidize the cost-of-capital for the project.
NMTC participants frequently loosened their underwriting standards or restructured deals, potentially increasing 
their risk level but keeping the project as a performing credit. Many would allow a higher loan-to-value ratio (51.2 
percent), find a new additional debt lender (37.2 percent), capitalize fees, which increases the loan amount or equity 
stake (34.9 percent), use a mezzanine loan (32.6 percent), allow longer amortization and interest-only periods (2.3 
percent), or provide subordinated debt and equity (2.3 percent). Some NMTC participants would hedge their risk 
by using third-party credit enhancement (32.6 percent), requiring more collateral (23.3 percent), or seeking bond 
financing (20.9 percent). 
NMTC participants also reduced their return by shrinking fees and spreads. They would waive standard fees (34.9 
percent), reduce the loan payback spread (25.6 percent), or reduce the project ROI (4.7 percent).  21
Table 4. Strategic Responses to Funding Gaps and Fee-Driven Issues (N = 46)
Strategic Response Percent Count
Find public grant-based source of funding 67.4% 29
Allow higher Loan-to-Value  51.2 22
Find private or foundation source of grant-based funding 41.9 18
Find new debt lender 37.2 16
Waive standard fees 34.9 15
Capitalize fees or additional costs into debt or equity 34.9 15
Use mezzanine loan 32.6 14
Use third-party credit enhancement 32.6 14
Reduce loan payback spread 25.6 11
Client pledges additional collateral 23.3 10
Bond financing 20.9 9
Refinance outstanding debt for our clients to free up their cash flow 11.6 5
Reduce the project ROI 4.7 2
Longer amortizations and interest-only periods* 2.3 1
Provide subordinated debt and equity* 2.3 1
Find additional public subsidy* (for example, an SBA loan) 2.3 1
*Write-in	strategic	choices	provided	by	the	survey	respondents
Statistical cross-tabs of funding gaps and fee-driven issues with later survey questions provided additional insight. 
This included the following findings:
•  NMTC participants that “generally” encounter funding gaps and fee-driven issues are more than twice as 
likely to seek out public grant-based funding to support the project pipeline. This was also the most fre-
quent response for those that encounter funding gaps “most of the time” or on “every project.”
•  The top-ranked portfolio categories prior to and during the recession to encounter funding gaps and fee-
driven issues were: (1) real estate development, (2) pooled funds, (3) commercial development, and (4) 
nonprofit growth.
•  NMTC participants that encountered funding gaps and fee-driven issues prioritized the reforms they fa-
vored as: (1) make NMTC a permanent program, (2) increase the annual NMTC allocation to $10 billion, 
(3) shorten the holding period for NMTC, (4) extend the carryback period up to five years for NMTC, and 
(5) make NMTC a “deeper tax” similar to LIHTC [Part III includes a discussion of this option].
Cost-of-Capital Advantages
The use of NMTC provides an advantageous cost-of-capital, often serving as “gap financing” and pushing projects 
over the funding tipping point. Of respondents, 42 answered this question, but seven had not been using NMTC 
prior to the start of the recession in December 2007. Later in the survey, respondents had a free-response opportu-
nity to describe their use of cost-of-capital advantages during the recession. Responses are shown in Table 5.  22
The top responses reflected the real estate tilt of NMTC. NMTC participants used less expensive capital costs to 
reduce developer or project financing costs (91.4 percent), capitalize fees or pre-development funding (37.1 percent), 
and cover operating expenses (22.9 percent). Several NMTC participants increased the social impact of their proj-
ects by using pass-throughs to support nonprofits (20.0 percent).  NMTC participants also capitalized separate loan 
funds (17.1 percent) or provided additional project equity (8.6 percent).
Table 5. Use of Cost-of-Capital Advantages due to NMTC Prior to the Recession (N = 35)
Use of Cost-of-Capital Advantages Percent Count
Reduced developer or project financing costs 91.4% 32
Capitalized fees or pre-development funding 37.1 13
Covered operating expenses 22.9 8
Used pass-throughs to support nonprofits 20.0 7
Capitalized a separate loan fund 17.1 6
Provided additional project equity* 8.6 3
Sized project so there was no excess capital* 2.9 1
Provided subordinated debt* 2.9 1
Capitalized gap equity* 2.9 1
Funded projects that would not have qualified* 2.9 1
*Write-in	use	of	cost-of-capital	advantages	choices	provided	by	the	survey	respondents
Responses to a later free-response question illuminated the strategies that NMTC participants have been using dur-
ing the recession. Thirty-three respondents concurred that NMTC provides a cost-of-capital advantage, while three 
responded that the question was not applicable to them. Five respondents used the below-market capital to provide 
additional equity (15 percent), five covered project funding gaps (15 percent), and two lowered debt service pay-
ments. One respondent forgave debt at the end of the seven-year holding period, one relaxed underwriting stan-
dards to allow a higher loan-to-value ratio, one passed through savings on the lower cost-of-capital to a nonprofit 
end-user, and one funded business expansion.  
The survey also elicited additional commentary on the poor state of the NMTC capital market, one of the greatest 
threats to the NMTC project pipeline. Four respondents noted the challenging credit environment, one could not 
raise an investor fund in NMTC as it had done in the past and instead partnered with a major commercial bank 
community development corporation, and one sought nontraditional sources of capital investment. One respon-
dent noted the declining value of NMTC, and another respondent noted the rising cost of conventional capital. 
In general, the responses to the two survey questions were similar to GAO findings, as shown in Figure 4 (GAO 
2010: 27). The GAO found that from 2003 to 2008, NMTC participants provided less expensive financing about 83 
percent of the time, while our survey found that option had increased to 91 percent prior to the beginning of the 
recession. Survey respondents in both the GAO report and our survey most commonly relied on structural changes 
that relaxed the terms of the loans. Subordinated debt, nontraditional credit, equity, and debt with equity features 
were mentioned in both, but subordinated debt was much less common among our survey respondents. Equity 
injections and equity to cover project financing gaps seemed to grow during the recession, rising to approximately 
15 percent of respondents.23
Figure 4. Uses of Cost-of-Capital Advantages, FY 2003 to FY 2008
Source: GAO Analysis of CDFI Funds (GAO 2010: 27)
Debt and Equity Investment Strategy
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been a slight increase in higher-risk NMTC equity investment, despite the reces-
sion, although the average NMTC respondent still favors debt over equity instruments. This increase was also 
evident in the shift among survey respondents from using cost-of-capital advantages to an increased use of equity 
investments. On a five-point scale ranging from “primarily debt” (one point) to “primarily equity” (five points), 
forty respondents ranked themselves at an average of 1.65 before the recession and 1.95 after the recession, as shown 
in Table 6. Respondents on both the debt and equity side noted that the falling value of NMTC required them to 
source additional debt or equity in accordance with their overall debt-equity investment strategy. 
It may be that the shift stems from a move away from subordinated debt to debt-with-equity features. As noted in 
the use of cost-of-capital advantages due to NMTC, more NMTC participants are using the less expensive capital 
and public or nonprofit capital sources to support higher leverage, and they are reserving the equity position in the 
capital stack for themselves. 24
Table 6. Debt and Equity Investment Strategy, Before and During the Recession (N = 45)
Time  
Period
Primarily 
Debt  
(1)
More 
Debt 
than 
Equity 
(2)
Equal 
Amounts 
of Debt 
and 
Equity 
(3)
More 
Equity 
than 
Debt  
(4)
Primarily 
Equity 
(5)
Rating 
Average
Response 
Count
Before the 
recession 
(prior to December 
2007)
20 17 1 1 1 1.65 40
During the 
recession  
(from December 
2007 to now)
17 19 3 3 2 1.95 44
Thirty-four of the NMTC participants provided write-in responses explaining how their debt-to-equity strategies 
have changed since the recession. (Three responded that the question did not apply to them, most likely because 
they had not been participating in NMTC prior to the recession.) Nineteen reported no change, and some noted 
the constraints of the related-party rule. Respondents also noted that lower NMTC value requires debt substitution 
(but not changed debt-equity proportions) from public sources to continue to make pipeline projects feasible. 
Of the respondents who had changed their debt-equity strategy, the split was nearly equal between those seeking 
more debt and those seeking more equity. Of the eight that are seeking more debt, three were specifically seeking 
leveraged sources, and two were seeking public-private debt sources and credit enhancement. Two were seeking 
sponsors who would bring their own debt lenders to the capital structure. Of the seven seeking more equity, they 
were interested in lower leverage levels, lower loan-to-value ratios, and obtaining public equity subsidies. One re-
spondent also noted the NMTC subsidy was producing less equity due to its lower price from investors. 
Portfolio Allocation
As predicted by the well-documented real estate tilt of NMTC investments, the majority of CDEs primarily partici-
pated in real estate development and related activities before the recession, as shown in Table 7. In fact, 19 respon-
dents (44 percent) weighted real estate at more than 75 percent of their portfolio, and 29 respondents (67 percent) 
weighted real estate at more than 50 percent. This tremendous exposure to real estate market volatility would have 
predicted a pullback from that sector as the recession deepened.
 On the contrary, the weight of real estate development, and commercial development in particular, increased 
substantially during the recession, as shown in Table 8. By March 2010, 38 respondents were involved in real estate 
activities (84 percent), with 24 (53 percent) at a rate greater than 75 percent, and 26 (57 percent) at a rate greater 
than 50 percent. At the same time, the commercial real estate segment rose from the third-ranked allocation at 62 
percent to second place at 71 percent. A large number of respondents also remained involved in mixed-use develop-
ment with an inclusionary housing component, although the portfolio weight of that real estate segment remained 
relatively small.25
Table 7. Portfolio Allocation Before the Recession (N = 43)
Ranked Portfolio 
Allocation before the 
Recession  
(Prior to December 2007)
<25% 
(1)
25–50%   
(2)
50–75%   
(3)
75%+ 
(4)
Average 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Participating 
Investor
Does Not 
Apply
Response 
Count
1. Real estate 
development
5 6 4 19 3.09 7 41
2. Pooled funds 4 1 2 5 2.67 20 32
3. Commercial 
development
9 4 7 7 2.44 7 34
4. Venture funds 2 0 0 1 2.00 23 26
5. Nonprofit growth 10 2 5 1 1.83 12 30
6. Industrial or 
manufacturing 
expansion
13 2 2 1 1.50 10 28
7. Entrepreneurial or 
business incubation
8 2 0 1 1.45 17 28
8. Workforce 
development
8 0 0 1 1.33 16 25
9. Mixed-use 
development*
16 2 2 0 1.30 11 31
10. Blended-value 
projects
2 0 0 0 1.00 24 26
*Mixed-use	development	with	inclusionary	rental	housing	component
Non-real-estate activities were also well represented among NMTC participants’ investment targets. Eighteen respon-
dents invested in nonprofit growth prior to the recession and 19 during the recession (42 percent for both periods). 
The number of respondents investing in industrial or manufacturing expansion declined, with 18 investing prior to 
the recession and 16 during the recession (42 percent versus 36 percent). Entrepreneurial and business expansion in-
vestment also declined slightly, with 11 investing prior to the recession and 9 during. Open-ended responses to the 
question mentioned that NMTC participants also invested in health care operations before the recession and CDE 
to CDE lending and charter school expansion before and during the recession. 26
Table 8. Portfolio Allocation During the Recession (N = 45)
Ranked Portfolio 
Allocation During 
the Recession (From 
December 2007 to 
March 2009)
<25% 
(1)
25–50%  
(2)
50–75%  
(3)
75%+ 
(4)
Average 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Participating 
Investor
Does Not 
Apply
Response 
Count
1. Real estate 
development
5 7 2 24 3.18 2 40
2. Commercial 
development
10 5 9 8 2.47 2 34
3. Pooled funds 2 3 0 2 2.29 17 24
4. Nonprofit growth 7 4 6 2 2.16 6 25
5. Workforce 
development
7 0 0 2 1.67 12 21
6. Industrial or 
manufacturing 
expansion
10 3 2 1 1.63 8 24
7. Entrepreneurial 
or business 
incubation
6 1 2 0 1.56 10 19
8. Mixed-use 
development*
15 2 3 1 1.52 7 28
9. Blended-value 
projects
2 1 0 0 1.33 18 21
10. Venture funds 3 0 0 0 1.00 17 20
*Mixed-use	development	with	inclusionary	rental	housing	component
Relative Importance and Performance of the NMTC Pipeline
The heavy weight of real estate investment in portfolios might suggest that NMTC pipeline investments have per-
formed poorly compared with the non–NMTC pipeline during the recession. However, again, the contrary appears 
to be the case. As shown in Table 9, on a five-point scale of non–NMTC investments performing “much stronger” 
(one point) to NMTC investments performing “much stronger” (five points), the ranking shifted from investments 
(both non–NMTC and NMTC) performing about the same prior to the recession, to NMTC investments per-
forming more strongly during the recession. In fact, the number of respondents choosing “non–NMTC: Stronger” 
dropped by more than one-half (from seven to three), and “non-NMTC and NMTC: about the same” by nearly 
one-half, from 16 to 9.  “NMTC stronger” nearly doubled, from 8 to 14, and the number of respondents choosing 
“NMTC: much stronger” tripled, from two to six. 
Even with the increasing concentration and tilt of real estate investments, NMTC portfolios with strong real estate 
components outperformed non-NMTC pipelines. This finding is particularly important given that survey respondents 
derive more than one-half of their revenues and assets from, and devote more than one-half of their human resources 27
to the NMTC pipeline (based on the 43 respondents to this question). In fact, several added to the open-ended 
response section that they are concentrating even more on the NMTC pipeline and hiring additional staff as a result. 
Since the recession began, 7 of the 43 respondents have increased their NMTC pipeline and 2 are new entrants.
Table 9. Pipeline Performance (N = 44)
Time 
Period
Non-
NMTC 
Much 
Stronger 
(1)
Non-
NMTC 
Stronger 
(2)
Non-
NMTC and 
NMTC 
About the 
Same (3)
NMTC 
Stronger 
(4)
NMTC 
Much 
Stronger 
(5)
Rating 
Average
Does 
Not 
Apply
Total 
Count
Prior to the 
recession 
(before 
December 
2007)
3 7 16 8 2 2.97 7 43
During the 
recession 
(from 
December 
2007 to 
March 2009)
3 3 9 14 6 3.49 6 41
Statistical cross-tabs of the NMTC pipeline strength with other survey questions further illuminated funding gaps 
and the importance of proposed reforms. This resulted in the following additional findings:
•  The top-ranked portfolio categories for the NMTC pipeline that were outperformining  the non–NMTC 
pipeline prior to and during the recession were also those categories most likely to encounter funding gaps 
and fee-driven issues. Those categories were: (1) real estate development, (2) pooled funds, (3) commercial 
development, and (4) nonprofit growth.
•  NMTC participants with a stronger NMTC pipeline ranked their top proposed program reforms as (1) 
make NMTC a permanent program, (2) shorten the NMTC holding period, and (3) extend the carryback 
period up to five years for NMTC offsets.
Community Benefits
NMTC participants seek community benefits as intended by the NMTC program. The perceived social return on 
NMTC investments is crucial to the CDE project pipeline. The competitive application for NMTC awards takes 
past achievements and future projections of community benefits into account, influencing the likelihood and size 
of future NMTC awards. Community benefits are broadly defined, but as shown in Table 10, survey respondents 
who answered the open-ended questions primarily focused on three main categories of benefits in impoverished 
census tracts. These are business and employment (92 percent), community services (30 percent), and real estate im-
provements (27 percent). Although there is a strong real estate tilt among respondents (84 percent participate in real 
estate activities), the community impacts that they seek are more focused on other community-building outcomes 
than just improvements to the physical environment.28
Table 10: Community Impacts and Investments (N = 37; multiple responses possible)
Business and Employment
Job growth
New business growth
Job retention
Expand business capacity
Business attraction
Business retention
Community services
Health services
Education access
Job training
Child care 
Homeless services
Hunger relief
Recreation facilities
34
29
2
1
1
1
1
11
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
Real estate improvements
Revitalization/blight
Affordable housing
Tax base growth
Commercial growth
Charter schools
Health care facilities
Enhance quality-of-life in  
    low-income communities
Energy conservation
Asset growth
Poverty alleviation
10
5
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
Just as the targeted social return on investment varies among NMTC participants, so too do the measures of project 
outputs. As many participants attempt to address several social impacts at once, job growth may be a more preva-
lent response than it would have been in other years, owing to the current focus on job loss as a consequence of the 
recession. Table 11 presents a subjective sampling of metrics that NMTC participants employ to assess the impact 
of NMTC investments. As expected, there is considerable variation in the methods, use of subjective and objective 
measures, and level of post-project follow-up. In fact, several respondents explicitly noted that their measures were 
subjective.
Table 11. A Subjective Sampling of Metrics Used, drawn from 37 Respondents Only
“We measure by requiring QALICBs* to count and we observe and verify.”
“[We] measure our project impacts by undertaking a detailed and com-
prehensive study to determine the true fiscal, economic, social/community 
and environmental impact.”
“During construction, we seek to maximize and directly track construction 
jobs for all types of projects in which we invest (for-sale housing, com-
mercial, mixed-use).  After construction, we seek to maximize and directly 
track full-time retail and office jobs for the commercial and mixed-use 
projects in which we invest.”29
“We obtain jobs information on each project (existing and projected).  
Some impact is subjective (not measurable), such as evaluating the type 
of and strength of the business.”
“We measure impacts using (i) staffing plans and projected operating bud-
gets of specific projects; (ii) economic impact studies prepared for specific 
projects; (iii) formulas for estimating economic impact for specific indus-
tries found in national reports; for "spec" projects we use standard job 
creation measures used by our local redevelopment agency. To estimate 
indirect job creation from both permanent and construction jobs when 
there are no economic impact studies for specific projects, we use na-
tional studies and the BEA's RIMS II Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS 
II) which we obtain for each state in our service area. Where possible, 
detailed industry multipliers were used; if tenants were not yet identified, 
aggregate industry multipliers were used. (RIMS II is widely used to ana-
lyze economic impacts.) To estimate construction jobs, we used estimates 
provided by general contractors for specific projects.”
“Do primarily charter school facilities and 330/Community Health Care 
facilities. Looking at number of new school seats added, low income 
patients served, construction jobs and permanent jobs increase.”
*QALICB	is	an	abbreviation	used	by	the	CDFI	Fund	for	a	Qualified	Low-Income	Community	Business
Importantly, none of the respondents mentioned a “but-for” test, as described by GAO, to determine whether a 
project would have occurred without the use of NMTC, and no respondents noted  a “no-action” alternative. As so 
many respondents focused on “job growth” and additional “growth,” “attraction,” and “retention” goals, the but-for 
test and no-action alternative should be a critical part of the methodology for determining the net gains in growth, 
attraction, and retention owing to NMTC-backed projects. 30
Analysis of Findings 
New Markets Tax Credit Program in Action
Survey respondents are adhering to the legislative intent of the NMTC program, harnessing the capital markets to 
achieve community development in impoverished communities. The NMTC industry estimates the $26 billion in 
NMTC funding has leveraged an additional $1.12 in private investment for every NMTC dollar (NMTCC 2010: 
17) and GAO has estimated a net present value of retained equity investment in low-income community entities 
of as much as 80 cents on each NMTC dollar (GAO 2010: 23). The real estate portfolio concentration of NMTC 
investments appears to be increasing, however, as 84 percent of respondents are involved in real estate activities, 
with more than half of those respondents said their real estate investments accounted for more than 75 percent of 
their portfolios.
Many of the respondents have participated in the NMTC program for multiple award years and have developed 
strong coalitions of investors, public agencies, nonprofits, and community-based organizations on projects, more 
than half of which are repeat projects. Community Development Entities are continuing to harness their social and 
community networks to source, develop, and implement deals, which matches the legislative intent for local control 
of capital investment. For every respondent, NMTCs accounted for more than 50 percent of the entity’s revenues, 
assets, and human resources. Several noted that they would be hiring additional staff to address their NMTC projects.
NMTCs are being used as an investment tool, often pushing projects in low-income communities over the tip-
ping point for financial feasibility. The credits are frequently twinned with other tax credits and subsidized with 
additional public and nonprofit funds to satisfy financing gaps, mitigate risk, and enhance investor returns so that 
the returns to investors are competitive with the capital markets. Most frequently, cost-of-capital advantages from 
NMTCs allow NMTC participants to offer lower developer or project financing costs (91.4 percent of the time). 
Other important uses of the less expensive financing include capitalizing fees or predevelopment funding, cover-
ing operating expenses, using a pass-through to support a nonprofit end-user, capitalizing a separate loan fund, or 
providing additional project equity. Surprisingly, the equity-to-debt portfolio balance has risen slightly since the be-
ginning of the recession, although the split between respondents was nearly equal between those seeking additional 
equity sources and those seeking additional debt sources. 
NMTC participants promote community benefits, which are loosely defined by the legislative intent of NMTC and 
the CDFI Fund but are integral to the mission of CDEs that participate in the program. Again, the intention of 
the original legislation was that locally based CDEs would be in the best position to maximize community benefits 
given their neighborhood knowledge.
The community benefits that participants are seeking and the method used to measure project outputs vary greatly. 
Nine in ten respondents are focused on employment and business growth and retention strategies, 30 percent on 
community services, and 27 percent on real estate improvements such as revitalization, blight removal, and new 
school and health facilities. While 84 percent are participating in real estate activities, these investments seem to be 
a tool to achieve other community benefits.
Overcoming Funding Gaps and Market Volatility
Assembling deals, based on the survey responses, depends strongly on relationships, local knowledge, and participa-
tion with public agencies in larger initiatives and redevelopment efforts. This is also highlighted in the case studies 
included in appendix C. These multiphase projects, repeat clients, and internally sourced deals that do not meet 
traditional underwriting standards help to fill the NMTC pipeline. 
Survey respondents use a variety of strategies to address funding gaps and fee-driven issues. Most rely on additional 
public or nonprofit sources of subsidy, including grants, credit twinning, bond financing, and loan products to fill 
financing gaps, provide credit enhancement, and preserve investor returns. Some respondents are also willing to re-
lax underwriting standards, lower debt service coverage ratios, or contribute additional equity or subordinated debt, 
accepting a greater level of risk to support high-impact projects. 31
NMTC participants face extreme market volatility, as does the rest of the financial industry. However, participants 
characterize their NMTC recession pipeline as stronger than their non-NMTC recession pipeline. Respondents 
report an increase in the relative strength of their NMTC pipelines over the pre-recession period, which means they 
have performed better during the recession. With the opportunity to carry back corporate tax offsets by one year 
and forward by up to 20 years, NMTCs remains an attractive product for investors, although the cost of waiting for 
profit can lower the net present value of investor returns. 
CDEs, along with rest of the marketplace, are experiencing difficulties accessing debt and leveraged lenders, and 
some are seeking project sponsors that bring lenders as part of the project package. Surprisingly, the same partici-
pants suffering from a lack of credit access have increased their average participation and average portfolio weight 
in real estate, which has substantially declined in value during the recession. That they are adding staff suggests a 
confidence in the ongoing performance of their NMTC investments, including their real estate portfolios. 
Survey respondents, many of whom have participated in NMTC during multiple years, are expecting to pull back 
from the program during the 2010 round. At the same time, the CDFI Fund expects to award another $5 billion 
worth of credits—and the price investors pay for credits is falling, with the GAO estimating that the value could de-
cline to as little as 50 cents on the dollar (GAO 2010: 23). As banks return to profitability, increasing demand may 
mitigate a surge in credit availability. More likely, however, a number of program reforms will be needed to preserve 
the value of the credits by feeding investor demand, expanding the categories of eligible investments, and lowering 
the costs associated with NMTCs.32
Part III: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Introduction
NMTC continues to push the financing of high-impact projects over the tipping point, as well as shift private 
market investment interest to poorer communities. As the NMTC program grows and matures, the government and 
the NMTC industry have proposed a number of reforms that are primarily aimed at reassuring investors, boosting 
demand by increasing the number of qualifying investments and tax offsets, and ensuring a consistent supply. All of 
these changes would reinforce the pipeline. 
Respondents prefer changes to the NMTC program that favor permanency, growth, and consistency. Seven in ten 
respondents want NMTCs to become a permanent program, 64 percent would like to increase demand by allowing 
NMTCs to offset the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), and 62 percent want the program to grow to $10 billion 
in annual allocation authority. From the outset of the program, investors have worried about the permanence of 
NMTCs and the potential implications (in legal and transaction costs) of rule changes.
Respondents also seek greater flexibility in using NMTCs. Three in ten support eliminating related-party rules that 
prevent a CDE from owning more than a 50 percent equity stake in a target investment. Three in ten also prefer 
an increase in the carryback potential for NMTC, allowing an investor to retroactively offset profits from past 
years. Currently, NMTC only allows an offset for one year prior. Approximately one-fourth of respondents prefer 
a shorter holding period for NMTC. A seven-year holding period represents a highly illiquid investment for a bank 
or financial institution. More investors would be attracted by a liquid investment product, and financial institutions 
would likely increase their initial value for the credit if they were better able to accurately forecast near-term market 
movements for the total holding period.
Several  comments to open-ended survey questions indicated that NMTC participants would benefit from less com-
plexity and fewer transaction costs associated with the program. Approximately one-fourth would like to reduce the 
fee structures associated with CDE participation, which have been driven up by legal costs associated with ensur-
ing investment compliance with NMTC criteria. Due to transaction costs, the industry has adopted the practice of 
requiring a minimum scale for NMTC investments as a way to justify the legal and transaction costs, and this de 
facto $5 million threshold is most easily satisfied with real estate investments, undermining the other community 
development goals of the NMTC.
One of the largest challenges from a policy perspective is addressing supply and demand imbalances that have 
reduced the value of NMTCs. Several respondents are already forced to fill the widening gap between the expected 
price for the credits and the price that investors are willing to pay. There is the potential for a purely market action, 
perhaps by experimenting with new leveraged capital structures, reassessing risks associated with NMTC projects, or 
encouraging new entrants who can achieve economies of scale or innovation. 
Without a market action to revive the value of NMTC, a government intervention may be necessary. A 50 percent 
gap in the value of the lost tax revenue and the community-level asset growth is politically difficult. The GAO 
has advanced a proposal to change the NMTC to a grant-based program, but only 2 of 13 open-ended responses 
favored this change (GAO 2010: 28-30). This alternative would entirely eliminate private investors from the NMTC 
program. Respondents also mentioned an interest in more lenient nonqualified financial property rules (in other 
words, raising the allowable maximum proportion of nonqualified financial property that is included in an NMTC 
investment). Respondents sought increased demographic eligibility, such as an expansion of qualified census tracts, 
for investments in Qualified Low Income Community Businesses. Both of these reforms would widen the NMTC 
pipeline and, as a result, could potentially increase demand, but have the potential to dilute the social impact of 
NMTC investments.  
Strengths of the New Markets Tax Credit Program
Strong performance, long-term involvement, and continued demand demonstrate that CDEs have strong interest in 
NMTCs. NMTC participants are striving to achieve community benefit goals critical to their organizational mis-33
sions. They are also striving to satisfy the requirements of the NMTC awards, and allow their investors to use their 
investments to satisfy Community Reinvestment Act requirements. NMTC participants are targeting net job growth 
and business development in low-income communities, which is consistent with the NMTC program’s intentions, 
as stated by former CDFI Fund Director Tony Brown. At the same time, program participants are also developing 
alternative methods for determining and measuring the impacts of these investments. From the beginning, NMTC’s 
community benefit goals—as legislated and implemented—have been open-ended (Armistead 2005; Brown 2002; 
GAO 2010: 32-35). 
The GAO and NMTCC have both independently found that NMTCs channel private investment to low-income 
communities by pushing projects past the tipping point that will attract private investors and fill in financing gaps 
for individual projects. With project origination at the CDE level where NMTC are also allocated, local control of 
capital investment is much more possible. Survey respondents reinforced the point that deal-sourcing and pipeline 
development are based on these local community networks and social capital, and particularly within public-private 
partnerships that advance common goals and contribute diverse sources of funding. This is particularly important 
for mitigating additional financing gaps that may develop after the project has been initiated. The majority of 
respondents indicated that this was a common occurrence, and approximately two-thirds would choose to seek ad-
ditional sources of public grant-based funding.
Challenges of the New Markets Tax Credit Program
The largest worry from the federal government’s perspective is the falling value of NMTCs, which appears to stem 
from oversupply. However, for survey respondents, the greatest concern is that Congress has not permanently 
authorized the NMTC program. These two perspectives could be at loggerheads if the government were to choose 
to move from a private investor-backed program to a grant-based program administered at the federal or state level. 
Although the GAO has minimized the switching cost from one program to another in its evaluation, in reality it 
could be quite significant and would leave current participants in the program with several more years to finish out 
the seven-year holding periods for ongoing investments. Furthermore, the CDFI Fund noted in a letter to the GAO 
that private investors provide the discipline necessary to ensure that CDE investments qualify for NMTCs. In fact, 
investors push CDEs to assemble projects that exceed NMTC’s poverty-based statutory requirements to ensure their 
investments are not placed at risk by a finding of noncompliance later, which would invalidate the NMTC credits 
that they had already claimed and trigger a tax bill with penalties for those claimed credits (GAO 2007: 51-52). 
Supply and demand imbalances and, possibly, saturation of the existing market with NMTCs could complicate 
ongoing expansion of the program. The majority of the survey respondents favored allowing NMTCs to offset the 
AMT, which would attract a new category of investors. Survey respondents were also interested in simplifying a 
number of requirements, which could have the same effect. As noted above, these included eliminating the seven-
year holding period and the related-party rule, increasing the businesses that are eligible for NMTC investments, 
and finding other ways to reduce the legal and financial costs of NMTC transactions. 
There are some market reactions that could have negative consequences for the NMTC program. From the survey 
results it is clear that real estate investments have increased despite the dramatic declines in real estate values and 
commercial real estate performance during the recession. NMTC participants are taking on a higher risk level by re-
laxing some underwriting standards, on average, and increasing their equity exposure. When NMTC-backed projects 
run into additional financing gaps, survey respondents turn to additional sources of public subsidy. In the current 
economic context, these additional sources of public subsidy may become much scarcer.
Finally, although local control of the definition of “community benefits” allows maximum flexibility within a 
community context, a lack of standardization prevents rigorous cross-sectional analysis of outcomes or the develop-
ment of any kind of effectiveness ranking. As a result, it is easy to question the net growth in job creation, business 
capacity, assets, or other measures that NMTC participants claim because very few, if any, subject their analysis to 
the “but for” test or compare their projects with a “no action” alternative (GAO 2010: 8-9).  Survey respondents 
reported community benefits other than real estate, but the majority of their investment activity has been real estate 
related. This disconnect potentially undermines the original intent of NMTCs to encourage investment in business 
growth and development, social service delivery, and community facilities. 34
Responses to Extreme Market Volatility
Extreme market volatility and the recession appear to have dampened 2010 demand for NMTCs, which could lead 
to a sharp decline in the investor purchase price of NMTCs, a decline already noted by industry sources, survey 
respondents, and the GAO. NMTC value may fall to as little as 50 cents on the dollar, from a historic high of 80 
cents on the dollar in 2004, representing a potential community impact loss of $1.5 billion on the 2010 $5 billion 
allocation (GAO 2010: 23). 
NMTC-backed projects already in the pipeline, however, are outperforming non-NMTC backed projects. Several 
survey respondents are increasing their NMTC portfolio weight and hiring additional staff to support these projects, 
which suggests that NMTC-backed projects are performing counter-cyclically and survey respondents are expecting 
them to continue to outperform other investment opportunities. 
Surprisingly, in addition to a growing real estate bias of NMTC investments in 2010, survey respondents are increas-
ing their equity-to-debt ratio slightly, on average, and relaxing underwriting standards, which would increase their 
risk exposure.  
The declining demand for NMTCs may arise for a number of reasons. Fewer banks and financial institutions had 
profits to offset during the past two recessionary years. Investor uncertainty about the long-term prospects and po-
tential rule changes may be holding investors back. 
NMTC participants’ real estate pipelines, which lag the market due to the time involved in developing an asset, 
may be approaching exhaustion. Without a recovery in the real estate market, or a strategy shift to distressed debt, 
foreclosures, and workouts, NMTC participants may not have any viable real estate investments on the horizon. 
Finally, the market may be suffering from sheer saturation as the volume of NMTC credits available has dramati-
cally increased over the past three years. Although demand for NMTC has always exceeded supply, there may be a 
shortfall of quality deals in the 2010 marketplace. 
There are a number of possible responses to a continued decline in the value of NMTC. The Obama administra-
tion, Congress, and the CDFI Fund are investigating a number of interventions to increase the demand and relax 
the rules for NMTCs at the behest of industry groups, including the New Markets Tax Credit Coalition and the 
American Banking Association (NMTCC 2008; ABA 2009; Gambrell 2009). At the same time, market conditions 
are rapidly changing, which may lead to an organic increase in demand, new entrants, and new financing strategies 
for using NMTC.
Congress, the U.S. Treasury Department, the CDFI Fund, and the Internal Revenue Service are actively pursuing 
changes that would boost demand for the credits. In particular, they are increasing the possibilities for tax off-
sets and simplifying the program to lower costs associated with legal and transaction costs. There is also a remote 
possibility that the very nature of the program would be changed from a tax credit to a grant-based program. Less 
optimistically, the quality threshold for NMTC allocations at the CDFI Fund may decline, as well as for target proj-
ects at the CDE level. Such a decline would impair the strength of the NMTC pipeline, however, and result in less 
satisfactory outputs and community benefits at the project level.
The market may develop its own response to the falling purchase price of NMTC. A rebound in financial institu-
tion profitability may drive up demand. Some survey respondents are already experimenting with new capital 
structures that bring in leveraged lenders tied directly to project sponsors. Others are seeking additional public and 
nonprofit subsidies that will preserve investor returns and fill in growing financing gaps as credit values fall. Several 
respondents are accepting lower internal rates of return on NMTC projects, as these returns still compare favor-
ably to greatly reduced returns from other investments. Ultimately, if the credits become undervalued enough, new 
entrants and opportunistic buys will increase, given that investors stand to gain substantially on the spread between 
the face value and the purchase price of the credits.
As participants seek additional public and nonprofit sources of capital for projects and participate in larger rede-
velopment or revitalization efforts (as several respondents noted), the need for and impact of public and nonprofit 
subsidy for NMTC-backed projects are likely to grow—and even more so if NMTC values continue to decline. How-
ever, with severe budget shortfalls at the state and municipal levels and falling nonprofit endowments, this strategy 35
may fall short and impair NMTC project pipelines. To make up the shortfall, NMTC participants may need ad-
ditional federal support, new for-profit capital partners, or untapped nonprofit partners such as anchor institutions 
(i.e., medical centers) that have program revenue streams that have weathered the recession.
Despite the recession and NMTC value decline, NMTC participants have continued to use the cost-of-capital 
advantages of NMTCs to subsidize projects costs, allow unconventional underwriting, and facilitate greater social 
impact in poor communities. Specific strategies during the recession that raise the risk profile for NMTC partici-
pants have included injecting additional equity into a project, covering project funding gaps, lowering debt-service 
payments, and relaxing underwriting standards to allow a higher loan-to-value ratio. Additional strategies include 
forgiving debt at the end of the seven-year holding period and passing through cost-of-capital savings to a nonprofit 
end-user. 
The additional equity investments and funding gap remedies noted by some survey respondents are consistent with 
the average slight increase in equity participation since the beginning of the recession. This is quite likely a necessary 
intervention as the value of NMTC, which are often used as gap financing, falls. Furthermore, equity contributions 
may be the only means to provide additional funding for some projects without violating debt service coverage ratio 
and loan-to-value ratio loan covenants. 
Finally, despite the challenges of the NMTC program and the market environment, NMTC participants continue 
to seek investments with a high social impact and positive community benefits. Community benefits in the NMTC 
program are broadly defined, but are essential to winning NMTC allocations from the CDFI Fund and are integral 
to the mission of the CDEs that receive them. Furthermore, investors have a vested interest in ensuring that projects 
are realized in communities with the greatest need that qualify under NMTC rules.
Respondents Weigh in on Proposed Reforms
Survey respondents provided clear preferences for the proposed reforms to the NMTC program. As shown in Table 
12, the weighted average responses based on a three-point scale and a sample size of 42 can be divided into three 
priority levels. The preferred actions represent a mix of program reforms and responses to supply and demand 
imbalances in the NMTC market. 
The top priority level addresses investor risk, NMTC demand, and consistent supply. In line with earlier industry 
findings and reporting, the greatest preference for reform is to make NMTC a permanent program. Seven in ten 
respondents found this to be important, while 64 percent sought to increase investor demand by allowing NMTC 
investments to offset the AMT. Just over six in ten (62 percent) of respondents sought a dramatic increase in the 
available supply of NMTC to an annual allocation authority of $10 billion. This is surprising in light of the falling 
value of the credit, although demand has always greatly exceeded supply based on NMTC applications. Furthermore, 
this desired increase is supported by earlier survey responses that indicate that NMTC pipeline performance has been 
superior to the pipeline for other investments and that participants are deriving more value and increasing the staffing 
related to NMTC. The latter suggests that participants are optimistic about a rebound in the value of the credits.
The second priority level would directly address the falling value of NMTC. Just over one-third (36 percent) of 
respondents wanted to make NMTC a “deeper” tax credit similar to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. Nearly 
three in ten (29 percent) would like to increase the carryback period for tax offsets from one to five years. This 
would allow banks and financial institutions that experienced losses during the recession to retroactively offset 
profits from more profitable years before the recession. In general, this reform would also smooth demand over the 
long-term, although it would also increase the risk of government tax revenue losses during recessions. 
Approximately one-fourth (26 percent) of respondents sought shorter holding periods for NMTC. This would 
reduce illiquidity risks for investors due to the seven-year holding period that is currently required for NMTC. This 
would also eliminate the risk and uncertainty of qualifying investments that mature early, before the end of the 
seven-year holding period. If an investment matures before the end of the holding period, the NMTC legislation 
requires immediate redeployment of the tax credit capital. Investors and CDEs have shied away from these types of 
investments and with an elimination of the seven-year holding period these short-term investments would become 
attractive, potentially expanding demand for NMTC.  36
The last priority included potential changes to the types of projects that would be eligible for NMTC. Three re-
spondents placed value in expanding NMTC to support equity investments in community venture funds. As noted 
previously, only three respondents participated in venture funds before and during the recession and, as a result of 
the recession, had scaled back that portfolio allocation. Only two respondents valued including home mortgages in 
the program, and one respondent in the open-ended response section stated that this “would be disaster” due to the 
overwhelming supply of mortgages.
Table 12. Respondents’ Ranked Preferences for Proposed Reforms (N = 42)
Potential NMTC Program 
Reforms
Most 
Important 
(3)
Second 
Most 
Important 
(2)
Third 
Most 
Important 
(1)
Rating by 
Weighted 
Average
Response 
Count
Make the NMTC a permanent 
program
22 6 2 1.90 30
Allow NMTC investments to 
offset the Alternative Minimum 
Tax
6 11 10 1.19 27
Increase the annual NMTC 
allocation authority to $10 billion
5 12 9 1.14 26
Make NMTC a "deeper" tax 
credit similar to the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit 
4 3 8 0.62 15
Carryback period of up to five 
years for NMTC tax offset
2 6 4 0.52 12
Shorter holding period for 
NMTC
3 4 4 0.50 11
Expand NMTC to support equity 
investments in community 
development venture funds
0 0 3 0.07 3
Pursue statutory changes that 
would enable NMTC investments 
to be used for home mortgages
0 0 2 0.05 2
There were 13 open-ended responses regarding the opportunity for program reforms. As shown in Table 13, 31 
percent favored eliminating related-party rules that require a CDE to maintain less than a 50 percent equity stake in 
any investment in a Qualified Low-Income Community Business to avoid classification as a related-party. Respon-
dents also noted that this is a policy position that NMTCC is advancing, which reinforces the interconnectedness 
and network-learning model of the NMTC community (Erickson 2009). Likewise, two respondents supported the 
GAO’s suggestion that NMTC change from an investor-based program to a government grant-based program (GAO 
2010: 28-30). The GAO believes this would reduce the loss of social impact value to communities at the investor 37
level when the credits sell for less than face value.
Approximately one-fourth (23 percent) favored reducing the fee structure, and 15 percent wanted to make the 
program more consistent. Two respondents perceived that transferring the NMTC program to the states for realloca-
tion, following the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) precedent, would support increased consistency and 
reduce the fee structure associated with NMTC.  
Table 13. Open-Ended Responses to Potential Program Reforms (N = 13)
Eliminate related-party rules*
Reduce fee structure
Limit CDE fees (direct and indirect)
Tax revisions for simpler structures,  
    resulting in reduced legal, transaction,  
    and exit costs
States administer and allocate NMTC,  
    which would eliminate sponsor fees  
    and standardize the program (reducing  
    legal and transaction costs)
Consistency
Sponsors can expect regular allocation
Shift to states for reallocation, as in  
    LIHTC
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
NMTC changed to a debt grant for CDEs**
Reduce risk to investor return
Federal guarantee for equity  
    investment in non-leveraged  
    structures
Program Scope and Applicability
A strong NO to making home  
   mortgages eligible
More lenient Non-Qualified  
    Financial Property rules
Program Implementation
Improved demographic eligibility  
   determination for Qualified Low- 
   Income Community Businesses
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
*Policy	position	advanced	by	NMTCC,	as	noted	by	respondent	
**Policy	position	suggested	by	GAO	(U.S.	GAO	2010),	as	noted	by	respondent38
Policy Recommendations
Congress should permanently authorize the NMTC program, but allow the year-to-year allocation to fluctuate as a 
monetary policy tool. 
•  The investor risk associated with ongoing uncertainty about the program is the largest obstacle to its ongoing suc-
cess and is also a contributing factor in the decline in the purchase price of NMTCs. When the NMTC program 
was enacted, previous federal grants-based programs had a mixed track record and, even with the current decline 
in value, the NMTC program is redirecting investment to low-income communities and building assets that 
remain in low-income businesses after the 7-year holding period for the investment ends. 
•  Permanently authorizing the NMTC program would allow CDEs and other NMTC participants to engage in 
long-term planning based on reasonable expectations. This would allow them to develop a much stronger deal 
pipeline and better weather market volatility.
•  The switching costs, investment in learning a new program, and uncertain status for past NMTC participants 
would be extremely challenging if the program were to fundamentally change. 
•  In addition, the CDFI Fund has noted that private investors are aligned with the program’s community benefits 
and low-income community investment intentions because they do not want their investments to be placed at 
risk by a finding of noncompliance after the fact. The current administration of the program aligns all parties’ 
interests in balancing community benefits and investor returns.
•  NMTC has already been used as a monetary policy tool, as part of the federal government’s response to the dev-
astation caused by Hurricane Katrina and as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Formalizing 
NMTC as a monetary policy tool could allow for more rapid deployment of NMTC in times of need.
Congress should seek to boost demand for NMTC, particularly with the increase in year-to-year supply of the credits. 
•  Increased demand would strengthen the NMTC deal pipeline, reduce the likelihood of new funding gaps owing 
to the decline in the purchase price of NMTC, and smooth volatility stemming from supply and demand imbal-
ances for NMTCs.
•  One area that has been overlooked in discussions is reevaluating the definition of poverty and, as a result, enlarg-
ing the number and size of low-income communities eligible for NMTC investment. Currently, 39 percent of US 
census tracts, home to 36 percent of the population, qualify for NMTCs (GAO 2010). There is growing agree-
ment that the definition of poverty may be outdated and that under new “living wage” regimes, the number and 
spatial coverage of the poor would significantly increase. 
•  As intended, the allowance of NMTCs to offset the AMT will encourage a new group of investors to bid for 
NMTCs. High net worth investors may see NMTC as a stable fixed-income (through income tax offsets) addition 
to a balanced long-term portfolio.
•  Congress should also strongly consider shortening the holding period for NMTCs to three to five years, or create 
two tiers of NMTC products with different tax offset allowances that would reward the investor that chooses the 
longer holding period. The current seven-year holding period results in a highly illiquid investment for banks and 
financial institutions and, as a result, they are bidding less to hedge against the possibility of underperformance 
against other investments. 
•  Increasing the investor demand for NMTCs and the supply of potential projects would also proactively address 
the potential for declining quality thresholds in NMTC award allocations or CDE project selection that could 
arise due to the need to deploy the current oversupply of credits.
Congress, the CDFI Fund, and the IRS should continue to seek ways to lessen the legal complexity and lower the 
transaction costs associated with the NMTC program.
•  The evaluation and reform process is already underway, but the GAO, industry groups, and survey respondents 
continue to cite the legal complexity and transaction costs of the NMTC program. The GAO has noted that high 
transaction costs reduce the amount of investment in low-income communities, undermining one of the key 
goals of the NMTC program.39
•  If the legal complexity and transaction costs of NMTC can be mitigated, positive secondary effects could emerge 
that advance the original intentions of the legislation. 
o  Currently, the high fixed legal and transaction costs are pushing NMTC participants toward real estate 
activities; these are one of the few ways that participants can distribute costs over a large project. If those 
costs decrease, non-real-estate projects would become more feasible. 
o  In addition, the steep learning curve and high costs of NMTC transactions favor incumbents in the NMTC al-
location process and industry consolidation, which threatens smaller, locally controlled CDEs. A decline in costs 
would allow smaller CDEs to more successfully compete for NMTC allocations and execute NMTC deals.40
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Appendix C: NMTC Case Studies
Case Study 1: Union Street Lofts 
Financing Gap
In 2004, a joint-venture partnership between the Waterfront Historic Area League (WHALE) and HallKeen faced a 
critical $3.9 million equity financing gap for a $12-13 million redevelopment project. The project was converting 
five historic, 100-year-old structures into the Union Street Lofts in downtown New Bedford, Massachusetts.  Hall-
Keen, based in Norwood, Massachusetts, is a for-profit real estate investment, development, and management firm 
with nearly forty years of experience. The firm focuses on affordable housing development and has a mission that 
expressly directs the use of partnerships to develop projects. This financing gap developed as a result of cost over-
runs from weather delays and more substantial structural deterioration than had previously been identified in the 
buildings (NMTCC 2006: 124; FHLB Bank Boston 2005; Sovereign Bank 2006). 
A sizable public-private coalition had assembled this project, which was anticipated to provide many community 
benefits to New Bedford, including affordable housing development, job creation, anchor institution engagement, 
retail diversification, around-the-clock attractions, historic stewardship, and downtown revitalization. Investor return 
to HallKeen would depend on the success of the mixed-use commercial and residential leasing for the Union Street 
Lofts. Nonprofit partners anticipated positive social impact returns based on the community benefits to be derived 
from the project. The returns for other private market financial partners were secured by a mix of public subsidies 
and guarantees. To fill the $3.9 million equity gap, however, any new investor would also need to earn a market 
competitive return.  
Project Leadership
WHALE uses historic preservation as a means to further community, neighborhood, and economic development, 
affordable housing initiatives, and planning efforts (for more information on WHALE, see its website at www.wa-
terfrontleague.org). It has also worked extensively with the City of New Bedford on the master plan for revitalizing 
downtown, which began to suffer rapid decline in the 1960s. WHALE played a leadership role in the enactment of 
the New Bedford National Historic District, which contains the Union Street Lofts, according to Patrick Sullivan, 
director of the Office of Housing and Community Development for the city of New Bedford, in a personal inter-
view in 2010.  
WHALE incorporated in 1962 as a 501(c)(3) membership-based nonprofit in New Bedford, where it has saved more 
than forty properties from demolition. WHALE was essential to gaining control of the site and obtaining Massachusetts 
Historic Tax Credits. According to interviews with Mark Hess, Senior Project Manager for HallKeen, a lead grant to 
WHALE from the Massachusetts Historical Commission supported the acquisition and predevelopment of the project.
Project Context
Prior to the start of the planning process, the City of New Bedford seized two of the properties, known as Lawton’s 
Corner, due to tax delinquency. The owner of the other three properties, known as the Coffin Press Lofts, was will-
ing to sell to WHALE because it was a mission-based nonprofit devoted to historic preservation. Together, these 
comprise the Union Street Lofts. New Bedford, in partnership with WHALE, had identified the group of proper-
ties as a high-priority catalyst for downtown revitalization. The deteriorated condition of these five buildings was a 
discouraging potential investors from redeveloping nearby properties. 
The City of New Bedford’s Office of Housing and Community Development, working with WHALE, crafted a 
Request for Proposals for the reuse of the buildings. The Department of City Planning changed the zoning to allow 
mixed-use commercial and residential structures, as well as an Artist Overlay District for artist live-work lofts, part 
of a new Arts and Cultural District intended to encourage new around-the-clock uses downtown. The District is an-
chored by two institutions, Bristol College and the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth College of Visual Arts, 
which had recently completed the conversion of a former department store that covered an entire city block.
The 70,000 square foot project refurbished approximately 16,000 square feet of ground floor retail and commercial 
space and created three ground floor artist live-work spaces, as well as 20 below-market very-low income and low-
income apartments and 15 market-rate apartments (NMTCC, 2006: 124) at the “epicenter” of the business district. 46
Community Benefits Intentions
The Union Street Lofts were intended to generate a number of community benefits. This would be the first project 
in New Bedford to adaptively reuse historic commercial buildings for mixed-use, create affordable and market-rate 
housing to begin to attract residents and evening visitors to downtown, mitigate blight, support the development 
of the newly enacted Artist Overlay District, and catalyze additional revitalization. The partners anticipated that the 
redevelopment would create 100 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) construction jobs and 50 FTE long-term jobs (both 
estimates are based on direct and indirect job creation) (NMTCC, 2006: 124). Surprisingly, the subsidies for the 
below-market housing made the development of market-rate housing possible, as there are no subsidies for this 
product type. From HallKeen’s perspective, according to Mark Hess, it would have been easier to finance and build 
only low-income housing on this site. 
The Role of New Markets Tax Credits
The Massachusetts Housing Investment Corporation, LLC (MHIC) learned of the funding gap from HallKeen, 
WHALE, and the City of New Bedford’s Office of Community and Housing Development, all of which had collabo-
rated with MHIC on past Low-Income Housing Tax Credit-backed projects and regularly conversed with each other 
(NMTCC, 2006: 124). The partnership and, as a result, the project were relationship-driven, according to Mark Hess.  
MHIC’s mission is affordable housing creation, but it has also funded mixed-use and commercial development 
to support economic development goals (MHIC, 2006). MHIC is a nonprofit syndicator, but operates for-profit 
NMTC funds. MHIC had created two fully owned Community Development Entity (CDE) subsidiaries, each rep-
resenting a closed-end investment fund, and won a $25 million New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) allocation from 
the Treasury Department’s Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) fund in 2002, the program’s first 
award year and 1 percent of that year’s $2.5 billion in total CDFI Fund awards (MHIC, 2006). The Union Street 
Lofts were located in a census tract that met the CDFI Fund’s poverty and economic development qualifications for 
eligibility and had the 20 percent commercial component that would qualify for NMTC (NMTCC, 2006: 124).
MHIC made a $3.9 million leveraged equity investment, filling the partnership’s financing gap. MHIC committed 
$11.22 million in tax credits, nearly 40 percent of its 2002 NMTC allocation, to the Union Street Lofts. The deal 
timing suited MHIC, which needed to rapidly deploy its tax credits to satisfy the conditions of the CDFI Fund’s 
NMTC award. To satisfy this rapid tax credit commitment, MHIC needed a project that was already in the develop-
ment pipeline (MHIC, 2006; FHLB Boston, 2005). MHIC’s equity investment covered approximately 35 percent 
of the total development costs. MHIC’s use of NMTC for this project was also the first example in the country 
of “twinning”, by combining NMTC with historic and affordable housing tax credits which would serve as a pilot 
financing structure for future NMTC-backed projects around the country (NMTCC, 2006: 124). 
Capital Structure
MHIC’s commitment was just one piece of a complicated capital stack that reflected the size and complexity of the 
public-private coalition backing the project [See Appendix Table 1]. The coalition developed because of compatible 
missions and shared project goals. HallKeen made a $2.4 million equity investment. MHIC was also able to arrange 
an additional NMTC-backed $300,000 direct subsidy by leveraging its NMTC credits through the Federal Home 
Loan Bank (FHLB) of Boston, with a mission of supporting housing and community economic growth and a focus 
on lower-income households (FHLB Boston, 2005). A combination of equity, subordinated debt, subsidies, and 
grants mitigated enough of the project risk and fulfilled loan-to-value requirements to allow the project to qualify 
for a $3.22 million long-term subsidized FHLB first mortgage through Compass Bank,9 a community bank that 
reinvests in the communities where it operates (FHLB Boston, 2006). The corporate office for Compass Bank was 
just down the street from the Union Street Lofts, and the principals of the bank had been particularly interested in 
the success of the project (Hess, 2010) 
In addition to the MHIC equity, the City of New Bedford and its Office of Housing and Community Develop-
9	 	Compass	Bank	was	acquired	by	Sovereign	Bank	in	2004	(Massachusetts	OCABR,	2004).47
ment contributed $1.525 million in subordinated debt through the HOME program10 and MassHousing contrib-
uted an additional $450,000 in subordinated debt through the Affordable Housing Trust Funds program. WHALE 
contributed $215,000 in historic preservation grant money to the project, thereby enhancing investor return on 
equity (NMTCC, 2006: 124). 
The transaction closed in 2004, after a year of negotiations and project development. The closing was complicated 
and this was the first time any of the partners had used NMTC. Creating the CDE and LLC vehicles, as well as 
making the lenders comfortable with the collateral structure, took significant time. The City of New Bedford’s $1.5 
million HOME investment provided additional reassurance to the lenders (Sullivan, 2010), as did the city’s letters 
of support (Hess, 2010). MHIC and MassHousing provided the financial and legal expertise necessary to structure 
the NMTC deal, allowing the partnership to avoid bringing in outside help and preserving more of the capital. 
NMTC filled a critical soft debt gap as the partners had desperately needed additional equity (Sullivan, 2010). 
Appendix Table 1: Union Street Lofts Capital Structure
Partner Organization Amount* 
(millions)
Capital 
Contribution
Capital Type Program Type
Developer – WHALE 
and HallKeen (JV)
2.38 18.90% Equity
Massachusetts Housing 
Investment Corporation 
(MHIC)
3.89 30.95%
Leveraged equity gap 
financing (NMTC)
NMTC (Syndicated)
FHLB Boston 
(Sovereign)
3.22 25.59%
Long-term subsidized first 
mortgage
Affordable Housing 
Program
City of New Bedford 0.98 7.75%
Subordinated debt 
(HOME)
HOME
City of New Bedford, 
Office of Housing 
and Community 
Development
0.55 4.37%
Subordinated debt 
(HOME)
HOME
MassHousing 0.45 3.58%
Subordinated debt 
(HOME)
Affordable Housing 
Trust Funds
WHALE 0.22 1.71%
Grants for historic 
preservation
Massachusetts 
Preservation Projects 
Grants
FHLB Boston 0.30 2.38%
Direct subsidy through 
MHIC leveraged NMTC-
financing program
NMTC pass-through
FHLB Boston 
(Compass)
0.60 4.77%
Credit advance for 
commercial space
Community 
Development
 
TOTAL
 
12.58
 
100.00%
*Figures	based	on	research	and	interviews	are	not	entirely	consistent,	but	the	total	project	cost	in	the	$12-13	million	range
Sources:	MHIC,	2006;	interviews	with	Mark	Hess,	Hallkeen;	Patrick	Sullivan,	City	of	New	Bedford;	NMTCC,	2006:	124;	FHLB	Boston,	2006
10	 	HOME	is	the	HOME	Investments	Partnership	Program,	administered	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development.	It	
is	the	largest	Federal	block	grant	to	States	and	local	governments	designed	exclusively	to	create	affordable	housing	for	very	low-income	
and	low-income	families,	providing	over	$2	billion	each	year	(HUD,	2010—ADD	HUD	2010	to	ref	list.	.48
Project Outcomes
Public-Private Coalition
Both HallKeen and the City of New Bedford found the public-private coalition to be effective and successful. Every 
coalition participant shared the same goals, which can be challenging with that many interested parties in a rede-
velopment project, and all of them embraced the creation of a combination of affordable and market-rate housing 
creation in downtown. According to Patrick Sullivan in personal interviews, the City of New Bedford remains very 
open to working in the future with HallKeen and has ongoing work with WHALE and the other public agencies 
involved in the Union Street Lofts project. Likewise, HallKeen is interested in collaborating with WHALE again, and 
has ongoing projects with MHIC, according to Mark Hess. Currently, HallKeen is exploring the adaptive reuse of a 
historic mill in Vermont for affordable housing with MHIC, which would use NMTC-backed equity for this project.
Community Benefits
The Union Street Lofts opened for occupancy in 2006. The project achieved a number of community benefits. The 
completion of the project (1) advanced the redevelopment of downtown properties, including the immediate adap-
tive reuse of three nearby historic commercial structures as market-rate condominiums, (2) attracted new market-rate 
residents and provided affordable very low- and low-to-moderate-income housing, and (3) used Bristol Commu-
nity College and the University of Massachusetts as anchors for the new downtown Arts and Cultural District and 
promoted linkages between the two institutions. The five vacant buildings that compose the Union Street Lofts 
were returned to the tax roll and are now fully occupied. Small business growth focused on night-time uses and serv-
ing new residents has continued, even during the recession (Sullivan, 2010). Some of the new renters work in the 
ground-floor retail (FHLB Boston, 2006).
Investor Returns
Investor returns to the project funders—the developer and the public agencies—could have been enhanced. The 
renovation of the retail portion of the project was expensive and required add-alternatives in the construction docu-
ments for the treatment of the retail façade. The resulting retail transformation was not as substantial as the city had 
hoped (Sullivan, 2010). At the same time, retail tenants throughout downtown have experienced sales growth. As 
Mark Hess told me in an interview,  “It used to be, there was plenty of open parking and nothing to do after 5 pm. 
This project has been a big part of the downtown revitalization—of course, this is a small downtown.” 
The 120 feet of retail frontage of the Union Street Lofts has not attracted strong new tenants, and the existing ten-
ants who were allowed to return after the renovation are unable to meet the project’s rent projections, hurting Hall-
Keen’s return on equity. In retrospect, says Hess, HallKeen would have provided rent subsidies and left the spaces 
unimproved, shifting the capital cost of any improvements to the tenants. HallKeen still has loan reserves, but may 
need to renegotiate terms with the first mortgage lender if the commercial rent continues to fall short. According 
to Hess, “this underwriting problem has not been endemic to NMTC,” but has been exacerbated by the recession. 
When the NMTC seven-year compliance period ends in 2011, HallKeen may be forced to sell some of its equity in 
order to refinance the Union Street Lofts. 
Project Performance
Patrick Sullivan, as director of the Office of Housing and Economic Development, contrasted the successes of the 
Union Street Lofts with the failures of other redevelopment projects in New Bedford. From the marketing perspec-
tive, other projects have failed when the developer did not match the product to the market or erred in market tim-
ing. From the management perspective, sufficient developer follow-through has been a problem. From HallKeen’s 
perspective, according to Hess, this is one of very few NMTC projects for which the financing actually closed; many 
others have not moved forward as a result of the recession.
The Impact of New Markets Tax Credits
Mark Hess calls the Union Street Lofts project, “a win for the City and a win for tax credit investors.” So long as the 
project avoids foreclosure, there are no risks for NMTC, LIHTC, or HTC investors. Despite cash flow and investor 
return issues for HallKeen, the developer would still participate in this project, even with the benefit of hindsight, 
and retain the NMTC component. Mark Hess said, in describing NMTC, it “doesn’t always pay to be first. It is a 
good program, but a little bit complicated and convoluted. It is an important program for a city like New Bedford 
that needs general economic assistance to bring in products and services, and not just help for low-income residents.” 49
Case Study 2: East Baltimore Development Initiative
11
Financing Gap
An enormous public-private coalition had formed around the 88-acre, $1.8 billion East Baltimore Development 
Initiative, formally launched in 2003. However, East Baltimore Development, Inc. (EBDI), the lead agency, faced an 
immediate construction financing and working capital shortfall (EBDI, 2010; NMTCC, 2006: 113-14). Due to the 
perceived investment risk in a troubled neighborhood for a speculative development, investor interest and tradition-
al sources of capital were unavailable, according to Christa Velazquez, director of social investments for the Annie 
E. Casey Foundation, in a personal interview in 2010.  Paul Brophy, of Brophy Reilly, LLC, a planning and eco-
nomic development firm based in Columbia, Maryland, recalled in a personal interview that the coalition, which 
included the State of Maryland and the City of Baltimore, felt that the redevelopment was essential to rebuilding a 
troubled community and increasing the competitiveness of the state’s already large bioscience cluster. The initiative 
was intended to spur job growth, local employment, workforce development, revitalize a blighted neighborhood, 
and provide a large number of economic and quality-of-life improvements, as recorded in a Community Benefits 
Agreement, for the people of East Baltimore.
Project Leadership
Master planning occurred between 2000 and 2003. Brophy conceived of the East Baltimore Revitalization Project in 
2000. As an unpaid advisor to newly elected Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley, Brophy convinced the mayor of the 
idea’s merits.12 Brophy, who characterizes himself as a “producer” and not a developer, also brought his experience 
working with land clearance and health sciences development in Pittsburgh and subsequent work at the Enterprise 
Foundation.
Negotiation began between Mayor O’Malley and Dr. Elias Zerhouni, who was an executive vice president at Johns 
Hopkins University and Medical Institutions and, subsequently, the director of the National Institutes of Health 
from 2002 to 2008.13 The coalition supporting this project rapidly grew to more than one hundred stakeholders, 
including high-level elected federal, state, and local officials, dozens of investment partners, and grassroots neigh-
borhood organizations (EBDI, 2010a). 
Johns Hopkins University and Medical Institutions and the City of Baltimore shared the costs of developing the 
plan for the East Baltimore Development Initiative and, in 2003, EBDI incorporated as a single-purpose nonprofit 
501(c)(3) to be the implementation agency. EBDI has a three-pronged mission to (1) attract economic development 
and population to East Baltimore, (2) support community development through workforce training, educational 
access, and affordable housing creation, and (3) support the neighborhood’s anchor institutions and grow the health 
and life sciences cluster in East Baltimore (EBDI, 2010a).
Project Context
The Historic East Baltimore Community Development Corporation, which had been proceeding with a house-by-
house renovation of the Middle East neighborhood, had concluded that it could not keep pace with the ongoing 
deterioration of the neighborhood. Middle East had been severely troubled since the 1970s and unresponsive to 
the city’s previous attempts at intervention, with a housing vacancy rate above 25 percent and a concentration of 
violent crime, drug trafficking, and chronic unemployment (EBDI 2010a; NMTCC, 2006: 113-14). At the same 
time, there was substantial market demand for life science research space adjacent to Johns Hopkins’ East Baltimore 
medical campus. Furthermore, the State of Maryland had adopted a strong policy and funding push to promote 
life science and biotechnology research and commercialization, as Maryland already had a strong and growing life 
sciences cluster. 
11	 	Maryland	State	Governor	Martin	O’Malley	referred	to	this	initiative	as	the	“East	Baltimore	Development	Initiative”	in	a	2008	speech.	
It	has	also	been	called	the	East	Baltimore	Revitalization	Project	(NMTCC,	2006:	113-14)	and	Baltimore’s	New	Eastside	Project	(EBDI,	
2010).		
12	 	Mayor	O’Malley	is	now	Governor	O’Malley.
13	 	As	of	2008,		Zerhouni	was	once	again	in	a	leadership	position	at	Johns	Hopkins	University	and	Medical	Institutions.50
The fifteen-year revitalization plan for the “Middle East” neighborhood is anchored by a 31-acre, 2 million square 
foot Life Sciences Park that would benefit from close proximity to Johns Hopkins Hospital. This is at the heart of 
Phase I, which began in 2003 and will be completed in 2010. Phase II, which includes the remaining 57 acres, began 
in 2007 and will be completed in 2013.
Community Benefits Intentions
From the City of Baltimore’s perspective, Middle East will once again become a functional neighborhood with a 
net tax revenue contribution and spillover benefits for adjacent neighborhoods in East Baltimore, home to about 
30,000 individuals (Cromwell et al., 2005: 114; NMTCC, 2006: 113-14). The project also aligns with the City of 
Baltimore’s “economic development approach: creating a clean and safe city, promoting workforce development 
and education, and implementing an economic growth strategy” (Cromwell et al., 2005: 115).14   
Projected community benefits from the East Baltimore Development Initiative include 2,200 new and renovated 
mixed-income housing units; 500,000 square feet of commercial, office, and ground-floor retail space; and commu-
nity and recreational facilities including a seven-acre neighborhood school, improved subway and bus transit access, 
and new public open space. Workforce development estimates projected the creation of 8,000 new permanent jobs, 
with at least one-third available to workers who hold only a high school diploma or equivalent (NMTCC, 2006: 
113-14; EBDI, 2010a).15
The Role of New Markets Tax Credits
While EBDI had the authority to lead the East Baltimore Development Initiative, it still needed funding to support 
the land acquisition. The cultivation of funding sources had started in 2000, even before the agency was formed, 
but had not been successful, according to Christa Velazquez of the Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
Brophy brought Enterprise Community Foundation into the coalition. Enterprise received a $90 million first-round 
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) allocation from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Community Development 
Financial Institutions (CDFI) fund in 2002, representing 4 percent of the total credits awarded that year. To receive 
the NMTC award, Enterprise launched a special-purpose, wholly owned for-profit Community Development Entity 
(CDE), ESIC New Markets Partners, LP, based in Columbia, Maryland. ESIC also received a second award in 2003 
for $140 million, again representing 4 percent of the total credits awarded that year (CDFI Fund 2010d).
Enterprise’s ESIC Fund committed $15 million worth of NMTC, or 15 percent of its 2002 portfolio, followed by 
another $15 million commitment in 2003, which represented 11 percent of its 2003 portfolio (NMTC, 2006: 113-
14 and CDFI Fund 2010d). All of the East Baltimore Development Initiative’s census tracts were eligible for the 
NMTC program based on poverty and economic development indicators; furthermore, the entire project is con-
tained within a Federal Empowerment Zone and a State Enterprise Zone (NMTCC, 2006: 113-14). 
Potential NMTC investors continued to be wary of the risk involved in purchasing the tax credits for a speculative 
project, however, and feared the possibility of EBDI default, in which case the tax credits could potentially lose 
their value.16 As a result, the coalition initiated dialogue with the Annie E. Casey Foundation (AECF) with the hope 
that AECF would provide a credit guarantee. AECF has a multi-faceted public service mission, but one core com-
ponent focuses on quality-of-life improvements for the City of Baltimore, where it is headquartered, only about two 
miles from the project location. AECF agreed to participate and took on a much greater leadership role in develop-
ing the community engagement process and community benefits package, which was enshrined in a formal Com-
munity Benefits Agreement (CBA) in 2003. AECF also contributed a package of grants, loans, and guarantees, in 
addition to credit enhancement on NMTC, participating in multiple funding rounds.
14	 	“This	strategy	calls	for:	building	on	the	city’s	assets,	particularly	higher	education	institutions,	industry	clusters	such	as	health	care	and	
life	sciences,	parks	and	other	natural	settings,	architecture	and	historic	structures,	and	neighborhoods…”	(Cromwell	et	al,	2005:	115,	
citing	Baltimore City 2002).
15	 	“Over	55	percent	of	the	project’s	on-site	jobs	awarded	to	local	residents	(120	from	project	area,	317	from	city	proper,	437	from	metro	
area).	35	percent	of	all	project	contracts	awarded	to	minorities,	women,	and	local	firms”	(EBDI,	2010b:	p2).
16	 	This	potential	tax	credit	loss	due	to	default	is	still	being	clarified	by	CDFI	Fund	and	the	IRS,	to	this	day.	The	credit	loss	to	the	investor	
may	not	necessarily	occur,	there	may	be	a	possibility	to	cure	the	loss,	and/or	it	may	be	possible	to	redeploy	the	credits.	A	potentially	
greater	risk	than	developer	default	would	be	CDE	default,	but	again	there	may	be	remedies	(Novogradac,	2010).	It	is	important	to	re-
member	that	this	was	still	at	the	beginning	of	the	NMTC	program,	when	many	of	the	program’s	intentions,	and	longevity,	were	unclear.51
Capital Structure
AECF’s prominent entry into the coalition and capital structure encouraged additional investors and grantees to 
join. AECF also actively sought out multiple new partners and investors to lend internal and external credibility to 
the initiative so that it was “not just AECF,” in the words of AECF’s Christa Velazquez. Velazquez characterized 
NMTC as “found money” that brought in the private market.
Once AECF’s credit enhancement guarantee was secured by its $4 billion endowment portfolio, Bank of America 
purchased ESIC New Market Partners’ tax credit allocation for the East Baltimore Development Initiative and later 
purchased the second allocation as well. The complexities of NMTC, which was a new product at the time, contrib-
uted to the length of the funding development period, the complexity of the closing, and the credit enhancement 
requirement for the private investor. In fact, the first closing took one year and the transaction cost, including legal 
fees, was around $1 million for AECF. 
Through an RFP process that ended with an announcement in December 2004, EBDI selected Forest City Enter-
prises–New East Baltimore Partnership, LLC as the developer of Phase I. In fact, the capital stack is complex, as 
shown in Appendix Table 2, with EBDI anticipating that more than 83 percent of the initiative’s $1.8 billion in 
funding for both phases will be from the private sector. The total NMTC portion of the project funding is projected 
to grow to approximately $47 million. The State of Maryland has also authorized a Tax Increment Financing Dis-
trict that will allow tax revenue resulting from the redevelopment’s added value to be reinvested in the initiative. 
Appendix Table 2. East Baltimore Development Initiative Capital Structure – Phases 1 and 2
Investor Funding
Capital 
Contribution
Private Developer Investment  $          1,467,350,000  83.1%
Tax Increment Bond Financing  $              44,326,166  2.5%
NMTC Debt and Fees  $              46,820,000  2.7%
Federal Funds  $               37,735,100  2.1%
State of Maryland  $              42,075,000  2.4%
Baltimore City  $              62,601,000  3.5%
Other Foundations  $              10,250,500  0.6%
The Annie E. Casey Foundation  $              33,211,719  1.9%
Johns Hopkins  $              21,551,168  1.2%
TOTAL  $          1,765,920,653  100.0%
										Source:	EBDI,	201052
Project Outcomes 
Public-Private Coalition
Brophy characterized the coalition as a “process success,” particularly considering the size of the undertaking and 
the number and diversity of stakeholders. EBDI is governed by a board that reflects the composition of the coali-
tion, with appointed members selected by the mayor of Baltimore, grassroots community organizations located in 
East Baltimore, the governor of Maryland, and the presidents of AECF and Johns Hopkins University and Medical 
Institutions. The appointed members, in turn, elect the remainder of the board members. This reflected an im-
portant compromise that Brophy brokered, as Mayor O’Malley initially wanted to retain complete control of the 
board. Brophy successfully argued that this would have undermined the coalition-building efforts and made the 
initiative appear to be much more top-down and “a city agency.” Furthermore, when AECF was brought into the 
coalition, President Doug Wilson was “attracted by the size and consequence of the project” and directed his staff 
“to play a major role in shaping the neighborhood benefits,” according to Brophy.
Brophy emphasized the importance of creating an institution – “a competent, well-trained land developer” – that 
could survive for the next thirty years, as it will face many internal changes as well as changes in the leadership and 
composition of the coalition partners. In particular, the East Baltimore Development Initiative will need to weather 
changing political will with successive mayoral and gubernatorial administrations. 
There were some ways that the leadership of the initiative could have been strengthened. Brophy believes that ad-
ditional Board training at the beginning would have helped the board to “congeal” more quickly. He also believed 
that there should have been core agreement on the boundaries of EBDI activities to counteract mission creep. He 
believes that EBDI was never meant to own and operate housing or other entities, particularly a new neighborhood 
school. These additional duties distract EBDI from its purpose and blunt its effectiveness, in Brophy’s opinion. 
Brophy believes that this project was “idiosyncratic” as Johns Hopkins had a vested interest in Middle East and 
might not be at the table again. The development of the project has helped the city and the state gain experience in 
coalition-building for projects that benefit Baltimore, as this is the single largest redevelopment in Baltimore since 
the revitalization of the Inner Harbor, about one mile from this project, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Community Benefits
Brophy described the long-term goals of the East Baltimore Development Initiative as: (1) transforming a neighbor-
hood, (2) marketing an attractive “neighborhood of choice,” (3) creating a successful set of life sciences companies with 
biotechnology-related jobs, and (4) providing a segment of jobs for low- to moderate-income workers in East Balti-
more. AECF saw the opportunity to create a “thriving mixed-income mixed-use community, ” according to Velazquez. 
The immediate benefits to East Baltimore to date are less drug activity, repopulation, and a new neighborhood 
school. By now, the initiative has helped half of East Baltimore’s residents either directly or indirectly, according 
to Brophy. Furthermore, EBDI launched the East Baltimore Workforce Alliance, which seeks to (a) link residents 
to educational opportunities and careers, particularly through the Baltimore Healthcare Coalition, (b) continually 
fill entry-level jobs with neighborhood residents, (c) integrate financial literacy and the practice of accumulating 
personal savings into workforce development, and (d) support at-risk populations, including ex-prisoners (Cromwell 
et al, 2005: 119).
Investor Returns
AECF’s oversized role in the project has led to internal debate about the appropriateness of the financial role 
that the foundation played. In particular, the social investing arm of the foundation believes that it should have 
provided less than 100 percent of the credit enhancement and loan guarantees. According to Velazquez, “there is 
a tendency for people to think that foundations should pay all of the costs, but receive none of the returns--and 
clean up everything that is problematic about a project. They don’t realize that there is a 9 percent opportunity 
cost for committing money from the endowment, and that the return has to be made up somewhere else.” In fact, 
Velazquez said, AECF sacrificed this return to enhance Bank of America’s return on its NMTC investment, allow-
ing it to receive a guaranteed minimum return and partially fulfill its Credit Reinvestment Act obligations.
For AECF, the scale of the East Baltimore Development Initiative was unprecedented, and AECF’s level of portfolio 
exposure to one project will not be repeated again. AECF has invested in many mixed-use projects, but typically by 53
lending to the nonprofit loan fund of a CDFI. Because Baltimore was AECF’s hometown, however, it accepted a 
higher level of risk. AECF does not anticipate putting any major new money into the initiative, or any other revi-
talization projects in eastern Baltimore. AECF continues to seek new partners and investors and has had to contend 
with the “branding” that East Baltimore Development Initiative is an AECF project. Going forward, AECF will be 
more focused on co-investments with banks, program-related investments, and investments in community develop-
ment financial institutions, according to Velazquez.17
Johns Hopkins is also making an additional substantial investment in its physical plant and other East Baltimore 
interests, with a projected investment between 2010 and 2015 of $1.2 billion in East Baltimore. Hopkins agreed to 
lease 100,000 square feet, or more than one-third, of the first Life Sciences building (Cromwell et al., 2005: 119). 
This leasing guarantee has attracted other biotechnology and life science tenants, helping to ensure an equity return 
for Forest City Enterprises on the construction and operation of the life sciences park. 
Project Performance
The East Baltimore Development Initiative was the only intervention in Middle East that had the necessary scale, 
large investment, and community benefits expertise to reverse the ongoing decline of the neighborhood.  According 
to Brophy, “once the process began, there was no going back,” nor any additional evaluation of balancing commu-
nity benefits and investor return. He went on to say that all of the sponsors believed there were community ben-
efits, satisfactory investor return, and a high level of community engagement through an inclusive public process. 
There was also never a “no action” alternative that would “pull the plug.”  However, Brophy added, there were no 
“metrics.” Decisions were based on “all judgment,” a feeling that the project would accomplish good for the com-
munity. Velazquez similarly characterized the project. 
The Impact of New Markets Tax Credits
AECF plans to use the NMTC knowledge that it gained from this project to share best practices with other foun-
dations and other redevelopment coalitions. AECF will describe the ways in which “the intensive involvement of 
a single investor or funder with deep pockets learns to be more efficient” and benefit from gaining expertise and 
economies of scale. While the transaction costs on first-round NMTC were “staggering,” at approximately $1 mil-
lion, they were consistent with the costs paid by other first-round awardees. By the time of the second investment, 
the transaction process was much easier. 
Brophy believed that NMTC had been helpful, but not crucial, to this project. To him, it was far more important 
that AECF served as the debt guarantor for Bank of America’s tax credit purchase. NMTC was the “icing” that 
brought in additional capital and the involvement of Enterprise Community Partners and AECF. For the first $15 
million allocation, NMTC’s complexity added many process meetings to the land acquisition and development 
transactions. The process also required a steep learning curve to understand how the credits would work, and AECF 
was “very annoyed” with the legal bills that accompanied the NMTC transaction. For the second $15 million al-
location, the process was much simpler, and faster, because the transaction was essentially the same.
The end of the seven-year NMTC holding period is approaching for the first-round NMTC award allocation, and 
new replacement equity has been sourced, some with follow-on NMTC awards. Although the value of NMTC has 
been declining recently, this has not affected the East Baltimore Development Initiative, given that the commit-
ments have already been made and the transactions have closed, according to Velazquez. Furthermore, as shown in 
EBDI’s capital funding projections, the project coalition is expecting to refinance existing NMTC loans with new 
NMTC loans and add on $15 million in NMTCs to the outstanding $30 million that have already been committed 
(EBDI, 2010a).
Importantly, the involvement of NMTC did guide some evaluation of the community benefits in the deal owing 
to rights and regulations attached to the NMTC approach. Despite NMTC serving as the “icing,” an internal screen 
was in place at the beginning of the transaction owing to the NMTC, “and then the deal was done.” In Brophy’s 
opinion, the NMTC requirements for the East Baltimore Development Initiative resulted in a project that contrast-
ed with other redevelopment deals in which “no one is looking at community benefits. It is essentially a real estate 
transaction.”
17	 	AECF	will	also	continue	to	make	grants,	and,	in	fact,	it	made	an	important	grant	to	support	the	Market	Creek	Project	in	San	Diego,	the	
subject	of	the	third	case	study	in	this	appendix.54
Case Study 3: Market Creek Plaza and Market Creek Village 
Financing Gap 
In 2004, the developers of Market Creek Plaza, a ten-acre, community-driven retail shopping center in the Diamond 
Neighborhoods of southeastern San Diego, sought a permanent loan of $15 million for a $23.5 million project. The 
Jacobs Family Foundation (JFF) and Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation (JCNI) had created the vision 
for Market Creek Plaza through an extensive community engagement process with more than 3,000 local residents. 
Market Creek Plaza was intended to capture the majority of the $60 million in local spending leakage (money that 
was spent by residents outside of the community, rather than locally) for groceries, household items, and services 
and serve as a welcoming new community space at the heart of the Diamond Neighborhoods, home to 88,000 
residents.18 Market Creek Plaza was also intended to be the gateway project to Market Creek Village, a 63-acre, $1 
billion transit-oriented development that would be entirely owned by the community by 2030.
Project Leadership
In 1998, JFF and JCNI of San Diego initiated the Market Creek planning process for the reuse of an 18-acre block 
of land that had been home to an aerospace factory. JFF had purchased the land and transferred it to Market Creek 
Partners, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of JCNI, for redevelopment. According to Chip Buttner, all of the proj-
ect’s profits would be reinvested in the community.
Based in San Diego, JFF was founded by the Jacobs family in 1988 and began as a grant-making nonprofit foundation 
involved in issues of neighborhood change, but quickly added technical expertise and hands-on involvement to its 
capacity. The late Joe Jacobs, the patriarch of the family and a billionaire, was uncomfortable with pure philanthropy, 
however, and sought to develop a foundation that focused on sustainable community and economic development 
instead. JFF’s mission is to strengthen impoverished neighborhoods in San Diego through strategic investment that 
supports “innovative, practical strategies for community change,” with community engagement values of “relationship, 
respect, responsibility, and risk” (for more information on the foundation, see www.jacobsfamilyfoundation.org).
JCNI, an offshoot of JFF, is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit incorporated in 1995. JCNI operates with a mission of “resident 
ownership for neighborhood change” to help the residents of the Diamond Neighborhoods lead and own the 
change in their neighborhoods. JCNI shares the same planning process values of JFF, and the two organizations are 
tightly bound together. According to Chip Buttner, oth JFF and JCNI have a sunset year of 2030, at which time the 
community will have full ownership of all development at Market Creek.
Project Context
JFF and the vision for Market Creek Plaza followed an unusual trajectory to arrive at the critical financing juncture 
in 2004. In 1998, JFF had been searching for a location in a bank building or shopping center to house a new foun-
dation headquarters. During the search, JFF’s intent shifted to become a much more place-based foundation rooted 
in the Diamond Neighborhoods. During a JFF meeting with a grantee, Joe Jacobs saw the abandoned aerospace 
factory and determined that JFF would relocate there and develop its own community-based shopping center, which 
would become JFF’s headquarters. JFF tried to pursue the typical developer escrow process and recruit tenants, but 
found no interested parties. As a result, JFF reformulated its approach. It began a community listening process and 
leakage analysis, a study of the amount of household and goods and services that were being purchased outside of 
the community but could be purchased within the community if there was a local retailer, to determine the optimal 
vision and tenancy for a future shopping center. JFF also purchased the factory outright, according to Chip Buttner, 
CEO and president of Diamond Management and the developer-operator of Market Creek. 
With ownership of the land and a completed vision and strategy for implementing Market Creek Plaza, JFF and 
JCNI once again sought bank financing. There was still no interest, however. Buttner characterized the bank’s resis-
tance to funding as “redlining,” or discriminatory lending practices that exclude communities–usually communities 
of color–from consideration for credit, lending, and mortgages. As a result, JFF borrowed against its stock portfolio 
18	 JFF	commissioned	an	economic	analysis	that	determined	this	was	the	annual	leakage	of	goods	and	services	spending	from	the	Diamond	
Neighborhoods.55
for an all-cash funding of the equity portion of Market Creek Plaza at a higher than typical equity level for a compa-
rable shopping center development. JFF and JCNI continued to be in the precarious position of needing a loan for 
$15 million of the total $23.5 to $25 million, for a debt:equity ratio of 65-70 percent. JFF and JCNI also needed a 
below-market rate, at a point above prime or less, for Market Creek Plaza to be financially sustainable and allow the 
use of more expensive local labor. The latter is  an important mission-based requirement for JFF and JCNI.
At the same time, JFF and JCNI staff people had an ongoing dialogue with the California Southern Small Business 
Development Corporation (CSSBDC), a nonprofit public-benefit corporation. CSSBDC is a local small business 
lender focused on minority- and women-owned businesses. It makes “patient debt capital” subprime loans on favor-
able terms to borrowers—interest-only loans for the first two years and interest-plus-principal for the following seven. 
CSSBDC is backed by the State of California Office of Small Business’ Loan Guarantee Program and subsidized 
with micro-grants from several foundations, according to Tracy Bryan, public affairs officer at JCNI. CSSBDC initi-
ated a conversation between JFF-JCNI and Douglas Bystry, President of Clearinghouse, CDFI, which is based in 
southern California (NMTCC, 2006: 18-19). 
CSSBDC also had an ongoing partnership with JCNI to incubate and expand minority-, women-, and locally 
owned businesses in the Diamond Neighborhoods. CSSBDC provided working capital and equipment loans and 
JCNI developed a special leasing program at Market Creek Plaza. Rather than paying a fixed rent amount, the 
entrepreneurs and small business owners paid a portion of residual income or monthly profits for their spaces in the 
shopping center (Bystry, 2005).
Community Benefits Intentions
Market Creek Plaza and the follow-on Market Creek Village have a strong community benefit vision, objectives, 
and process that are shared by all of the public-private partners, including the NMTC investor, Wells Fargo Bank. 
The overarching vision is to (1) unify residents, (2) strengthen the process of community change (including anti-
gentrification measures), and (3) develop residents’ leadership abilities and financial independence. The objectives, 
said Tracy Ericson, senior vice president at New Markets Tax Credit Investments, were (1) economic development 
and neighborhood redevelopment, (2) community pride and community investment, (3) job creation and workforce 
development, (4) wealth-building, and (5) grocery and bank access. To fully engage the community, Bryan said, JFF 
and JCNI implemented enormous direct community engagement strategies; an elaborate and self-sustaining struc-
ture of visioning, process, and feedback community-based teams; and a system of ensuring community representa-
tion in the governance structures of Market Creek Plaza and the follow-on projects (Market Creek Partners, 2007).
The Role of New Markets Tax Credits
Clearinghouse CDFI is a mission-driven, for-profit lender focused on economic development, community benefits, 
and investor returns. Specifically, it has a mission to “provide economic opportunities and improve the quality of 
life for lower-income individuals and communities through innovative and affordable financing that is unavailable 
in the conventional market while achieving shareholder objectives” (Clearinghouse CDFI, 2010).
Clearinghouse CDFI had recently received a $56 million first-round NMTC award allocation, or slightly more than 
2 percent of the CDFI Fund’s $2.5 billion in awards for 2002. Clearinghouse CDFI was able to arrange a $15 mil-
lion loan, about 27 percent of its NMTC portfolio for that year, through Wells Fargo’s Community Development 
Corporation. They lent to Market Creek Partners, LLC, at a 3 percent rate, instead of the market rate of 6.0 to 6.5 
percent, with the explicit intention of supporting the community benefits in the Market Creek vision (NMTCC 
2006: 18-19). Market Creek Partners met the Treasury Department’s CDFI Fund’s NMTC eligibility requirements 
for poverty and economic development. Market Creek Plaza is also located within a State Enterprise Zone.  
Closing the NMTC transaction took several months. For all of the public-private partners, this was a new program 
that required considerable legal and accounting expertise to implement. Furthermore, several nontraditional aspects 
of Market Creek Plaza made underwriting more complicated. For example, the special residual leasing structure 
developed by JCNI for new entrepreneurs made it difficult for Clearinghouse CDFI to project Market Creek Plaza’s 
net operating income, a key factor for determining valuation, debt service coverage ratio, and other important parts 
of the risk analysis (Bystry, 2005). JFF’s financial position, backed by its multi-billion dollar endowment, was crucial 
to making the underwriting possible, according to Buttner. 56
The first four banks that Clearinghouse CDFI approached declined to invest. The Jacobs family and JFF already had a 
depository relationship with Wells Fargo Bank, so the partnership was able to leverage that into a commitment. Wells 
Fargo Bank was initially reluctant to pursue an NMTC investment due to the risk of being unable to recapture its 
investment and not knowing whether the NMTC program would last, according to Ericson. The bank needed an ad-
ditional three months to complete due diligence, develop the tax credit investment strategy, and approve the underwrit-
ing. The process was also complicated by JCNI’s residual leasing program for entrepreneurs at Market Creek Plaza. In 
fact, from a credit perspective, the bank completely wrote off the “nonprofit” tenants. Wells Fargo was able to approve 
the investment, however, at an advantageous 3 percent fixed-rate for the full seven years of the required NMTC holding 
period. The guaranteed minimum returns due to the use of NMTC, as well as Wells Fargo’s decision not to leverage the 
loan, made this subsidized rate possible (Bystry, 2005). According to Tracy Ericson, internally, Wells Fargo Bank had a 
policy in place that it would accept a lower rate of return as a trade-off for higher-impact community benefit projects, 
resulting in a “bifurcated pricing structure.” Wells Fargo also provided a $35 million construction line of credit. 
Capital Structure
The advantageous NMTC-subsidized loan rate for Market Creek Plaza allowed Market Creek Partners, LLC, to meet 
the targets set by the community visioning and the metrics established by JFF and JCNI. The sheltered amortized 
principal repayments freed up working capital for the next part of the project, according to Bryan and Buttner. 
NMTC “has helped keep the cost of money for development low, keeping more money in the community and 
freeing foundation funds to support more community development work. The NMTC program has literally made 
community ownership of the plaza possible.” Program-Related Investments (PRI) from other foundations provided 
additional subordinate debt and safeguarded investor returns on the CDFI Clearinghouse loan. According to Tracy 
Bryan, the Rockefeller, F.B. Heron, Annie E. Casey Foundation, and Legler Benbough foundations provided $2.5 
million in PRI subordinate debt for Market Creek Plaza [See Appendix Table 3].
Appendix Table 3. Market Creek Plaza Capital Structure (as of 2008)
Partner Organization
Amount 
(millions)
Capital 
Contribution
Capital Type Program Type
Diamond Community Investors $0.5 2.1%
20% Preferred 
Equity
Community 
Investment
Neighborhood Unity 
Foundation
$0.5 2.1%
20% Preferred 
Equity
Community 
Investment
JCNI $2.35 10.0% Junior Equity Permanent Financing
Jacobs Family Foundation $2 8.5% Junior Equity Permanent Financing
CDFI Clearinghouse $15 63.6% Permanent Loan NMTC - Wells Fargo
Rockefeller Foundation $1 4.2% Subordinated Debt
Program-Related 
Investment
Annie E. Casey Foundation $1.25 5.3% Subordinated Debt
Program-Related 
Investment
F.B. Heron Foundation $0.5 2.1% Program Support
Program-Related 
Investment
Legler Benbough Foundation $0.5 2.1% Program Support
Program-Related 
Investment
 
TOTAL
 
$23.6
 
100.0%
Source:	JFF-JCNI,	200857
Project Outcomes 
Public-Private Coalition
The strengths of the public-private coalition played a strong role in making the Market Creek developments possible. 
Buttner had been a contractor, banker, and developer, so he contributed important interdisciplinary expertise. In ad-
dition, Buttner said, “it has helped the project tremendously to have foundation people and for-profit people. Discus-
sions used to be contentious, but then the people pressing for social benefit versus financial returns switched roles.” 
JFF and JCNI initiated and have led the project as well as provided equity financing and credit enhancement that 
leveraged debt financing. JFF and JCNI have fulfilled their investor criteria of strategic investment and sustainable 
development, as well as the social return criteria of community visioning, a high and ongoing level of community 
engagement, and the first steps toward actual community ownership of the Market Creek developments. In fact, 
according to Tracy Bryan, JFF and JCNI hope to transfer complete ownership of Market Creek Partners, LLC, the 
owner of Market Creek Plaza, to the community by 2012.
The president of Clearinghouse CDFI, Doug Bystry, also became an important proponent for Market Creek. Wells 
Fargo Bank, the NMTC investor, was a key member of the public-private partnership and expressed interest in addition-
al NMTC investments at Market Creek. NMTC continues to be an important means for Wells Fargo Bank to fulfill its 
Credit Reinvestment Act requirements and offset its federal taxes on profits. According to Tracy Ericson, the bank also 
actively markets its community benefit investment in Market Creek Plaza within the Diamond Neighborhoods.
Community Benefits
With financing complete and construction ongoing, the remainder of Market Creek Plaza opened for occupancy 
about 12 months after the transaction closed.19 Diamond Management was the general contractor on the construc-
tion and, as a result, ensured that 75 percent of construction jobs were sourced from within the Diamond Neighbor-
hoods. Market Creek Plaza sustains 206 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs, although community hiring has fluctuated. 
The Joe & Vi Jacobs Center, an add-on development, provides an additional 100 FTE jobs and workforce develop-
ment training, according to Tracy Bryan.
Tenancy in Market Creek Plaza met community visions, local ownership desires, and achieved a top ten tenant mix 
based on community meetings and surveys. The mix included a food store, drug store, and entertainment, accord-
ing to Bryan. The Market Creek team attracted Food4Less as the 57,000 square foot anchor grocery tenant. Food-
4Less recruited 91 percent of its employees, all of whom completed a JCNI workforce development program, from 
the neighborhood. In addition, Market Creek Partners reserved 17,000 square feet for small tenants according to the 
formula of one-third locally owned, one-third newly incubated entrepreneurs, and one-third chain stores. 
Wells Fargo further supported Market Creek Plaza by opening a bank branch, and Starbucks occupied a food pad. 
Starbucks is part of the Urban Coffee Opportunities licensed brand, a joint-venture 50/50 partnership between 
Starbucks Corporation and Magic Johnson’s Johnson Development Corporation. Urban Coffee Opportunities is a 
mission-based for-profit that reinvests most of its returns in the community, guarantees a living wage and benefits, 
and has a target market of urban, ethnically diverse communities nationwide (Market Creek Plaza, 2006; Magic 
Johnson Enterprises, 2010). According to Bryan and Buttner, JFF and JCNI valued brand-name chain stores as an 
important component of the Market Creek Plaza tenancy, given that they would attract sufficient foot traffic—as 
does a San Diego Gas & Electric bill paying center—to support the locally owned tenants. 
Three additional projects have added community benefits value to Market Creek. JCNI completed the $2.4 million 
Chollas Creek restoration in 2001, with significant community engagement in the wetlands restoration and installa-
tion of public art. JCNI completed the Elementary Institute of Science in 2003 for $5.4 million. According to Chip 
Buttner, the community and JCNI completed a follow-on habitat restoration project, the Chollas Creek Encanto 
Tributary Restoration Project in 2008, for $1.7 million with 2,250 linear feet of wetland reclaimed from a polluted 
channel of a creek. A local firm that the partnership incubated served as the prime contractor.
19	 	Portions	of	Market	Creek	Plaza,	such	as	the	anchor	grocery	tenant,	had	opened	as	early	as	2000.58
Investor Returns
The community benefits from the Market Creek developments are sizable, and the community ownership inten-
tions are unprecedented in scale, ambition, and implementation. In 2006, Market Creek Partners opened an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) targeted to neighborhood residents who wanted to invest in the equity portion of Market 
Creek Plaza. The IPO would have occurred sooner, but Market Creek Partners waited until Market Creek Plaza had 
proven its viability and also had to obtain approval from the state’s Department of Corporations for the right to 
sell to unqualified investors.20 Approval took six years of negotiations. The department imposed a ceiling of $10,000 
per investor, and investors had to understand that they were investing in a double-bottom line corporation; that is, 
community benefits objectives could potentially reduce investor returns, without being a breach of fiduciary duty 
on the part of Market Creek Partners. Preferred units in Diamond Community Investors (DCI) were priced at $10, 
with a minimum purchase of 20 units. Four-hundred and sixteen “investors” representing 600 local community 
residents purchased interests of between $200 and $10,000. Together they hold a 20 percent ownership stake. The 
average investment is $1,185 and investors can purchase their interests using a payment plan. Each resident, regard-
less of the size of the investment, has one shareholder vote. There is a nine-member DCI advisory council that 
represents the preferred investors, and one member of this board has a seat on the board of Market Creek Partners. 
Investors earned a 10 percent preferred return during the first year.
Residents have also created a separate 501(c)(3), the Unity Foundation, to determine how to use the profits from 
Market Creek Partners to continue to improve the neighborhood. The Unity Foundation owns an additional 20 
percent of the Market Creek Plaza equity and also receives preferred dividends (JCNI, 2008). 
The seven-year holding period for the NMTC that supported Market Creek Plaza is almost completed, but JFF 
and JCNI anticipate favorable NMTC refinancing of this loan, according to Buttner. In fact, it is possible that the 
commercial balloon loan could be refinanced as a new NMTC-backed loan if Market Creek Partners undertakes 
improvements such as environmental sustainability upgrades, public infrastructure improvements, or attracts a new 
tenant with significant community benefits (such as a nonprofit health provider, for example). The appraisal value 
of Market Creek Plaza has substantially increased since the development began, which would support a low interest 
rate, as the loan-to-value ratio and risk factors would be low.
Market Creek Plaza has captured $40 million of the estimated $60 million in leakage from the Diamond Neigh-
borhoods. After one year, the Food4Less had 25 percent higher gross sales per square foot than comparable stores 
(NMTCC, 2006: 18-19). The local residents who invested in preferred shares in DCI have earned 10 percent 
preferred returns the first year. The two largest resident-owned businesses were current on loans and lease payments. 
Construction contracts of $27 million, representing 76 percent of work through 2007, were awarded to minority- 
and women-owned businesses, including a local company that took on the restoration of Chollas Creek (JFF & 
JCNI, 2008).
Subsequent Development
JFF and JCNI built the Joe and Vi Jacobs Center as part of the second phase of Market Creek Village. A $15 million 
NMTC-backed permanent loan was arranged through Clearinghouse CDFI, at a rate of 2.5 percent. U.S. Bank and 
Washington Mutual purchased the credits (JCNI, 2008). (See Appendix Table 4 for the complete capital stack). The 
three-story, 75,000-square-foot building includes a meeting and conference center with banquet service on the first 
floor, six to ten commercial offices on the second floor, and the headquarters of the Jacobs Family Foundation on 
the third floor. An economic analysis commissioned by JFF and JCNI determined there was significant economic 
leakage in the convention and tourism industry, valued at $8 billion per year in San Diego, from the Diamond 
Neighborhoods. Services targeting this leakage were viable for this location, five minutes by freeway from down-
town. With a pro forma goal of $4 million in revenue per year, the meeting and conference center employs an addi-
tional 100 community residents and trains them in hospitality, is nearing the break-even point, and has a long-term 
community ownership strategy, according to Bryan. As both Buttner and Bryan point out, the advantageous NMTC 
finance rate for the Joe and Vi Jacobs Center once again allowed for much greater capacity building than would 
have normally been possible because less income had to be applied to interest payments.
20	 	According	to	Tracy	Bryan,	the	Department	of	Corporations	requires	private	placement	investors	to	be	of	high	net	worth,	so	that	a	total	
loss	of	an	investment	would	not	impair	them	financially.	JCNI	had	to	convince	the	Department	of	Corporations	that	the	investments	in	
DCI	would	be	scaled	to	the	means	of	the	investor	and	that	investors	would	be	thoroughly	screened	and	educated	about	the	investment.	
The	final	agreement	allowed	investment	of	up	to	10	percent	of	annual	income	or	10	percent	of	net	worth,	but	below	the	$10,000	ceiling.59
Appendix Table 4. Joe & Vi Jacobs Center Capital Structure (as of 2008)
Partner Organization Amount 
(millions)
Capital 
Contribution
Capital Type Program Type
Private Investors (Seeking) $5 17.5% Equity *To Be Determined
CDFI Clearinghouse $15 52.6% Permanent Loan NMTC - US Bank & WaMu
JCNI $3.5 12.3% Subordinated Debt Permanent Financing
Jacobs Family Foundation 
Grant
$5 17.5% Grant Building Infrastructure
 
TOTAL
 
$28.5
 
100.0%
Source:	JFF	&	JCNI,	2008
JFF, JCNI, and the equity owners of Market Creek Plaza now control 45 acres and will add 9 more acres in the near 
future, with an ultimate goal of 63 to “achieve scale” for Market Creek Village (JCNI, 2008). 
The Market Creek Village site includes 20 acres of brownfields and contaminated apartment buildings, and the co-
alition has completed site cleanup and preparation. At its maximum extent, the vision for the entire 15-year build-
out of the site includes 800 new homes, 350,000 square feet of commercial and industrial development, and 500 
additional jobs. Total investment could reach $1 billion, and NMTC-backed financing would play a key role (JCNI, 
2008). An enlarged public-private coalition has emerged for this project, including the San Diego City Council, San 
Diego Redevelopment Agency, San Diego Association of Governments, Urban Land Institute, San Diego Funders 
Collaborative, Rockefeller Foundation, and McCormack Baron Salazar, a for-profit community developer that will 
be the master site developer. 
Market Creek Village’s residences were originally intended to be owner-occupied residences, but the recession has 
changed the plan to a mix of one-third rent-to-own and two-thirds rental. The rent-to-own residences are primarily 
targeted to moderate-income households earning $37,000 per year. The rent-to-own component is structured such 
that residents can purchase an ownership share in a single-purpose LLC cooperative and the rent pays the debt ser-
vice and amortization of the construction and development loans. At a rent of one-third of gross income, or $850 
to 1,150 per month, the households could have never afforded to pay more than 20 percent of the true rent-to-own 
value. NMTC allows a repayment of 61 percent of every dollar, with a 91 percent ownership subsidy.
Within the footprint of the Market Creek developments, JFF and JCNI, in collaboration with the community, are 
also developing the Market Street Industrial Park. JCNI is pursuing an expansion of the Empowerment Zone to 
include this area. A combination of adaptively reused and new structures will focus on green technology.
The Impact of New Markets Tax Credits
NMTC made the Market Creek developments feasible. The advantageous debt rates made the community benefits 
of Market Creek possible, according to Buttner. The low rates of the NMTC-backed loans also stemmed gentrifica-
tion by allowing Market Creek Partners to subsidize leases. Without NMTC, Wells Fargo Bank would have been 
unable to partner in the redevelopment, according to Bryan.
The requirements of NMTC were aligned with the intentions of the public-private coalition for the Market Creek 
developments, but some of those goals affected the financial returns of Market Creek Plaza. If Market Creek 
Partners had been able to lease out all of the retail space to national tenants, the shopping center would have had 
higher foot traffic and stronger sales performance. As Buttner pointed out, 80 to 90 percent of small businesses go 
under, and it is difficult to scale up small businesses even if they succeed. During the recession, Food4Less managed 
a 12 percent sales growth, while the locally owned restaurants saw 30 percent sales declines. Stronger profits overall 
would have allowed the next phases of the Market Creek developments to proceed more quickly. However, if Mar-
ket Creek Plaza had not included community benefits, such as promoting local entrepreneurship and ownership, it 
would not have qualified for NMTC.60
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